{Gerund) - , . , . : , , , , . : , , .
| Indefinite | Perfect | |
| Active | writing | having written |
| Passive | being written | having been written |
.
Singing gave him pleasure. - .
Fighting for human rights in every corner of our planet has become the goal of his life. - .
.
All his thought was of examining the problem. - .
The lecture is worth listening. - .
-- , ( ) .
Professor avoided coming home late. - .
Senator denied being involved into conspiracy - .
to begin, to start, to continue , . to enjoy, to forget, to hate, to like, to dislike, to neglect, to omit, to detest, to prefer, to prevent, to refuse, to regret, to remember, to resist , .
, ( ) .
, , .
-
| to mind to to object to to postpone to to prevent from to propose to to put off to to rely on to succeed in to thank for to think of to wonder at |
:
to be fond of
to be interested in
to be pleased at / with
to be proud of
to be sure of
to be surprised at
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|
|
to agree to
to depend on / upon
to give up
to hear of
to insist on
of / for. , .
I'm glad to have the opportunity of settling the conflict. - .
The possibility of using this method is very important for our future work. - .
, ( ) .
Today Human Rights Organisations got their structure by learning from mistakes. - .
UNIT 7.
Recent History of Russia
1. , .
Few propositions about today's world can be stated with greater certainty: never in the four and a half centuries of the modern Russian state has there been a Russia less imperialist, less militarised, less threatening to its neighbours and the world, and more susceptible to the Western ideals and practices than the Russia in the present. Although obvious even to a person with only a cursory acquaintance with Russian history, this state of affairs results from a long series of complex, often painful, and always fateful choices made by the first post-Communist regime. Some of the most critical decisions were made between 1991 and 1996, when Russia was reeling from economic depression, hyperinflation, pain of market reforms, and postimpe-rial trauma.
Along with finding its place and role in the post-Cold War world, Russia also had to make some critical choices about the "post-Soviet political space," as the territory of the former Soviet Union has been referred to in Moscow since 1992. At that time, everyone -from the national patriots on the Left to the radical free marketers on the Right - agreed on four things. First, a stable and prosperous Russia was impossible without a modicum of stability in the "post-Soviet space." Second, some sort of mending of millions of ruptured economic, political, and human ties ("reintegration") was imperative if the entire area was to survive the transition. Third, Russia could count on no one but herself in securing peace and stability in the area. Finally, Russia's pre-eminence as the regional superpower was not negotiable. The consensus dissolved into two sharply divergent objectives and
strategies. One was aimed at making the post-Soviet space resemble the USSR as closely as possible and as quickly as possible. In the other model reintegration was given a far less ambitious content. Its advocates relied on the incremental pull of a privatised Russian economy and its democratic stabilisation to do the job. Its time frame stretched over decades. Russia opted for the latter plan.
2. 1 , .
3. , .
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| 1. regional superpower 2. foreign policy 3. Western ideals 4. post-Soviet space 5. pain of market reforms 6. cursory acquaintance 7. securing peace 8. divergent objectives 9. modicum of stability |
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g
h.
i
4. . . , .
13 - the year 2037 - 12:19 p.m. - - the first Tuesday following the first Monday of November - 18 - - Saturday, June 21, 1941 - - -134 - 1 1700 . - the twentieth century - Highway 54 - - - nine-one-one - Sunday, May 1 - -- - ten minutes past three - 25 thousand dollars -
128.69 percent - - - 6th Avenue - -422 - - on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays - 1380 . - 3 p.m. Greenwich Meantime - a quarter to eleven - Pennsylvania Avenue 1600 - - - 3 dollars 87 cents - seven days a week - 67 - the year 1215 twenty minutes to six - - 8:25 a.m. - -Vol. 56, no. 34,986 - 150 - 2 2002 . -apartment A101 - 546 pages - 17:48 - 23 , - - - 783 - January 20, 2001 - - 0. 75 percent - - 443 78 - -2 - the year 2156-24 - 715 - 14 - LR-5 - - 65 miles per hour - midnight - -95 - 28 - 37- - October 31 - a quarter past eleven - 23:55 - - - 56th Street - - 21, . 3 - fourteen dollars per hour - - 283 miles - 716-44-20 - Thursday, October 17, 2002 - 4-1 - - -86 - at the age of 37 -' 669 - 38 million dollars - - - 1 , - - 230 thousand men.
5. , .
The Soviet Union, as it emerged from the successive changes after the Second World War, had only a limited capacity for radical experimentation. Brezhnev and his fellow leaders understood and welcomed this. But there were economic set-backs, social alienation and national, religious and cultural embitterment. Only in 1985 when Gorbachev came to power there was a serious reconsideration of the compound's problems. At first this was attempted cautiously. In the end he developed an audacious program of comprehensive reforms which led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and to the emergence of new forms of state and society in Russia and the other former Soviet republics. But in 1970, despite its growing problems, the Soviet Union was still a stable entity and was treated by the rest of the world as
a permanent feature of the international landscape. Statesmen, scholars and commentators took it for granted that Soviet armed strength and political militancy were too great to be ignored. The USSR had nearly reached military parity with the United States, and the Soviet economy had the world's second greatest industrial capacity and already produced more steel, oil, pig-iron, cement and even tractors than any other country.
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5. 5 , .
7. , . .
.... 27 January 1987.... the plenum Gorbachev went. the offensive
and called.... changes.... the party's official ideas. He described the country's condition as "socialism.... the process.... self-development." Implicitly he was suggesting that socialism had not yet been built.... the USSR. Gorbachev made several political proposals: the election rather than appointment.... party committee secretaries; the holding.... multi-candidate elections.... the Soviets; the assignation.... non-party members to high public office. Gorbachev aimed.... industrial as well as political democratisation. He intended to reconstruct the Soviet compound and his country would patent a new model.... political democracy, economic efficiency and social justice.
8. . .
1970- - 1980- , , . , , , . 1980- , .
- - . - . , , . 1980- . , .
9. . 8. .
10. , .
Russia's historic disarmament results from political and economic democratisation, not from a weak economy, as often suggested - as if national priorities are determined by economists. The shrinking of the Russian military might is due to the weakening of the Russian state's grip on the economy, the free mass media, and competitive politics. Most fundamentally, Russian demilitarisation is a consequence of rearranged national priorities, of a change in the criteria of greatness, and of society's gradual liberation from the state. Russia has abandoned the tradition of the unchallenged preponderance of the state's well-being and concerns, particularly in the matters of foreign policy and national security, over domestic economic and social progress. The vigilance against foreign aggression, the strength of the fortress-state, and the allegiance and sacrifice to it have been replaced in a new national consensus by the goals of societal and individual welfare, new civil and political liberties, and stabilisation within a democratic framework.
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In June 1997, in a television address to the nation on the seventh anniversary of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia, the President said: "A great power is not mountains of weapons and subjects with no rights. A
great power is a self-reliant and talented people with initiative. In the foundation of our approach to the building of the Russian state is the understanding that the country begins with each of us. And the sole measure of the greatness of our Motherland is the extent to which each citizen of Russia is free, healthy, educated, and happy."
11. 10 , . .
12. , , , - . , . , .
13. , .
1. Any historical system is believed to have three moments in time: its
genesis (which needs to be explained, but which normally occurs as
the result of the collapse of some other historical system), the rela
tively long period of what might be called the "quasi-normal" func
tioning of a historical system (the rules and constraints of which need
to be described and analysed), and the period of terminal crisis (which
needs to be seen as a moment of historic choice whose outcome is al
ways undetermined).
2. The theory of history turned out not to survive the test of empirical
experience very well.
3. As an indication of how far Moscow has travelled away from its past, it
appears to have dropped objections to admitting to NATO the former
Soviet Baltic republics.
4. World society legitimates different kinds of actors - individuals, states,
interest groups, and international organisations; all of which are known
to come into conflict.
5. The alliance of two European democracies is unlikely to be anti-
American.
6. Russia is sure to deploy much diplomatic pressure that great land pow
ers have used for millennia to assert control over the declared sphere of
influence.
7. One of the Russian politicians is supposed to have said once that
"making predictions is very difficult - especially about the future."
8. Such seemed to have been the goal of the second economic revolution
in Russia that the President heralded in March 7, 1997 address to the
Federal Assembly.
9. The obstacles to the rapid evolution into liberal democracies prove to
be of three basic types: interest groups, collective action problems, and
culture.
10. The twentieth century is said to have developed not in the way it had
been destined for Russia.
11. Some leaders are held to place personal ambition above their pro
claimed principles.
12. In those states in which a regime largely respects civil liberties, civil lib
erties seldom happen to be enough to fulfil the average person's sense
of what should define a democratic society.
13. The importance of this crisis is likely to have been exaggerated by
both parties involved.
14. The parties engaged into one of the most corrupt elections ever ap
peared to be unaware of the real political agenda.
15. Soon after the failure of the August take-over in 1991 the Soviet Union
was announced to be dissolved.
14. , . .
1. Calls came yesterday from the leaders of the party that it was neces
sary to make next year the year in which the opposition can no longer
resist.
2. There are many reasons why the process of shifting from manufacturing
to services that began in the West in the 1940s was delayed in Russia for
nearly half a century by the state-owned economy.
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3. It is not strange, that millions of scientists, military officers, university
professors, and engineers employed by the enormous military industrial
complex were devastated as the result of the demilitarisation of the
country.
4. Between 1992 and 1995, Moscow implemented all commitments of the
last Soviet government so that to complete contraction of the empire in
herited from the Soviet Union - a contraction remarkable for being un
dertaken in peacetime and voluntarily.
5. It is quite normal, that Moscow, as in Soviet times, remains Russia's
gateway to the world, the magnet for the country's most energetic and
successful citizens, as well as the cultural and social trendsetter.
6. It was not unusual that decrease in defence procurement begun with an
80 percent cut that was ordered by the government in 1992.
7. It is quite natural that the departure of the last Russian soldier from the
Paldiski submarine training base in Estonia in September 1995 marked
the end of Russian presence in East-Central Europe.
8. That the lands acquired and held during two and a half centuries of Rus
sian and Soviet imperial conquests were restored to the former captive
nations and Russia returned to its seventeenth-century borders is not un
usual at all.
9. The only way to end almost two centuries of conscription in Russia is to
introduce the institution of an all-volunteer armed force.
10. That Russian capitalism is a subject of heated debate in academic and
business circles is not extraordinary.
11. There are many reasons why we should regard the present character and
the future course of Russia's economic and political revolutions as in
evitable.
12. The only way in which we can explain the establishment of the bounda
ries of the post-war geopolitical influence is to turn to Yalta meeting of
the heads of state of the USA, the USSR, and Great Britain held in Feb
ruary 1945.
15. , .
1. 1980- , , .
2. 1980-
,
.
3. , 1985 - 1991 .
.
4. ,
- ,
,
.
5. , 10-15
.
6. ,
,
XX .
7. , ,
, .
8. , , ,
.
9. ,
, ,
.
10. 1980- , ,
- .
11. ,
1980-
1989 .
12. ,
,
,
.
16. .
agreement
1) , (about, on): to come to an agreement - , to express / reach agreement - , agreement of opinion - , complete / full / solid agreement - , mutual agreement - , tacit agreement - ; 2) , (about, on; between; with): to come to / conclude / enter into / negotiate / work out / reach an agreement - , to carry out an agreement - , to break / violate / denounce an agreement - , , contractual agreement - , ironclad agreement - , tacit agreement - , tentative agreement - , armistice / cease-fire agreement - , bilateral agreement - . Syn: covenant, pact, treaty
Depression
, , : to cause a depression - - , major / severe depression - , minor depression - , economic depression - . Syn: recession, crisis
Policy
, , , : to adopt / establish / formulate / set a policy - , , to adhere to / follow / pursue / carry out / implement a policy - , to form / shape a policy - , cautious policy - , clear / clear-cut policy - , conciliatory policy - , deliberate policy - , , established / set policy - , firm policy - , flexible policy - , home / internal policy - , foreign policy - , government / public policy - , open-door policy - , official policy - , friendly policy - , prudent policy - ,
, rigid policy - , , scorched-earth policy - , long-range / long-term policy - , short-range / short-term policy - , sound / wise policy - / , tough policy - , , wait-and-see policy - , bridge-building policy -
Reform
1. . 1) , , , : to
carry out/effect a reform - , ,
agrarian / land reform - , reform policy -
, far-reaching reforms - , radi
cal / sweeping reforms - , , eco
nomic reforms - , Syn: improvement
2. v. 1) , , , ;
. Syn: to amend, to improve, to correct; 2) (
)
Regime
; , , : to establish / overthrow a regime - / , puppet regime - , totalitarian / authoritarian regime - / , regime of economy - . Syn: government, administration, rule, management
17. .
Scorched-earth policy - - - tacit agreement - deliberate policy - -puppet regime - - to establish a policy - contractual agreement - - minor depression - - - open-door policy - - to implement a policy - to cause a depression - - to denounce an agreement - -ironclad agreement - public policy - - - tentative agreement - - open-door
policy - - - radical reform - - mutual agreement - bridge-building policy - - reform policy - - to overthrow a regime - - rigid policy - -to adhere to a policy - - - conciliatory policy - bilateral agreement - - .
18. , .
| regime | improvement |
| policy | recession |
| reform | pact |
| agreement | administration |
| depression | course |
19. .
1. How did Russia develop in the post-Cold War world?
2. What caused the appearance of a new national consensus in Russia?
3. What was Russia's response to the challenge of the global transforma
tions of the 1980s?
4. What did Russian demilitarisation result from?
5. What foreign policy did Russia pursue in the 1990s?
20, . .
* Russia is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.
(Winston Churchill)
* Somebody said the second most stupid thing in the world a man could say was that he could understand the Russians. I've always wondered what in the hell was the first.
(Ronald Reagan)
Luck and destiny are the excuses of the world's failures.
(Henry Ford)
* You cannot ask one Utopian to live in another's Utopia.
(Gilbert Keith Chesterton)
* A generation which ignores history has no past - and no future.
(Robert Heinlein)
* Rule One of the book of war is: Don't march on Moscow.
(Field Marshal Lord Montgomery)
> , , . . .
:
political space, political climate
international arena, international landscape
the reign of law, in the eyes of law, the theatre of war
home front ( home news)
to bombard with questions
, .
:
splendid fighting material
disastrous war
outstanding figure
popular leader
unpopular ministers greatest industrial capacity great power
. .
:
to have a finger in every colonial pie
to burn political bridges
to solve the riddle of the universe
> , . , . , .
, 1980- . , reconstruction {restructuring) openness, . , perestroika glasnost.
, . (1865- 1876 .) Reconstruction. . .
, , , , reform. - .
, . (New Deal) - - 1930- . - , Square Deal Fair Deal.
