| г | ||
| 50 500 000 | 50 100 000 | |
| 15 794245 | 14 805717 | |
| 2 000 000 | ||
| ʳ | 72 929 | 68 271 |
| 54 510 | 47 531 | |
| ʳ | 1 646 | 1 551 |
| ( ) | 39,9 | |
| ( ) | 3,5 | 3,2 |
| ( ) | 1,444 | 1,362 |
| ( ) | 0,104 | 0,105 |
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As the degree of admissibility of risk is rejected, a reasonable, maximum permissible, excessive.
Rejected the risk level is so small that he stay lows directly within the tolerances of natural (background) level.
Acceptable level of risk is such that society can accept (allow), taking into account technical and economic and social opportunities at this stage of development.
Maximum allowable risk - is the maximum risk, which should not be exceeded, despite an expected result.
Excessive risk is characterized by exceptionally high levels, which in most cases leads to negative consequences.
In practice, to achieve zero risk, that absolute security is impossible.
Because of this requirement of absolute security that attracts their humanity, can lead to tragedy for the people. Rejected risk at present is also impossible due to lack of technical and economic preconditions for this. Therefore, the modern concept tion of life safety is based on achieving a reasonable (acceptable) risk.
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The essence of the concept of acceptable (acceptable) risk is in an effort to create such a low security, which sees society at present.
Acceptable risk of combining technical, economic, social and political aspects and is some compromise between the level of safety and capacity of its achievements. The size of acceptable risk can be determined using expensive mechanism that allows to distribute the cost to society of achieving a given level of security between the natural, technological and social spheres. Necessary to maintain the appropriate ratio of costs in these areas, as imbalance in favor of one of them can cause a sharp increase in the risk level and yogi will go beyond acceptable values.
Fig. 1 shows the graph that illustrates a simplified example of the definition of acceptable risk. This graph shows that with increasing costs of security technical systems provided the technical risk is reduced, but increasing social economy. Spend excessive funds to improve the safety of technical systems in conditions of limited resources, can cause damage to social sectors such as health care worse.
. 1. Determination of acceptable risk.
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Total risk is minimum at a certain ratio of investment in technical and social spheres. This fact should be considered when choosing a risk that society is still forced to accept.
The maximum acceptable level of individual risk of death of man generally considered a risk equal to 6.10 per year. Small (rejected) is an individual risk of death of man, equal to 8.10 per year.
The concept of acceptable risk can be effectively applied in to any field of activity, industry, businesses, organizations and institutions.
2.4. Risk Management
The fundamental question the theory nd practice of BC is to increase security.
If a risk can not be excluded completely, it is necessary to reduce the likelihood of risk to acceptable levels by selecting the appropriate decision. To achieve this goal, as a rule, any system or situation in several ways.
Ways to reduce risk:
full or partial waiver of works, operations and systems that have a high degree of risk;
replacing hazardous operations other less dangerous;
improving the technical, systems and facilities;
development and use of special protection;
measures of organizational and managerial character, including control over the level of security, training people on security, incentives tion safety and behavior.
Criterion for selection of measures: In order to give preference to specific measures and tools, or some of their complex, compare the costs of these interventions, and level of harm reduction, which is expected as a result of their introduction. This approach to reducing the risk of danger is called risk management.
Conclusion. risk management - the choice of means and measures ↓ R by criteria:
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In matters of risk management is the last place is the cost of administration.
Figure 2 (from the directory "Risk Management") graphically illustrates the model cost index, expected, based on the cost of the system compared with the probability of those costs. Acceptable price index dangerous situation identified five (actually you can use any code, it will only lead to a change in slope Lina). The example in this figure refers only to material losses. Possible harm to personnel (death, injury, western voryuvannya) in this example is not considered. In case of damage to personnel losses in the value system and related costs should be reviewed by the importance of preserving human life.
This hypothetical illustration shows a system in which allowed a reasonable probability of a dangerous situation in 1000 if costs are less than or equal to $ 5000 Just had projected a loss of $ 5 million, if the possibility of such a situation - 1 of 1 million would be acceptable risk. Using this concept as a baseline, we can determine the qualitative and quantitative limits for any other situations. However, since the dependence of the cost of risk is set to phase development project during its implementation sometimes becomes apparent that certain circumstances make increased risk compared with programmable.
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Fig. 2. Index of losses expected
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Another aspect of how determined the cost to the size of acceptable risk is the ability to control or eliminate risk.
Some dangers are relatively low risk, considers yutsya unacceptable because they are relatively easy to control and eliminate.
For example. Lightning: R = 1 / 14 million, but nobody wants to risk it all and hide in the room during a thunderstorm. Management costs and eliminate risk - low. We must not remain on the street and go into the room.
2.5. Qualitative analysis of hazards
Above it was shown that each system or operation does not guarantee absolute safety. And yet until we have 100% security, we endeavoring mosya as possible, closer to that goal. Over time, various measures and methods used to solve relevant problems, improved, increasing our ability to study systems, identifying hazards, exclusion or control these hazards, reducing risk to an acceptable level when working with these systems. Analysis of the dangers of a rough start to the study, which basically allows you to identify sources of hazards. Then, if necessary, research may be profound and can be made a detailed qualitative analysis. Methods of analysis and techniques used in their implementation, known under different names. Here are some of these common tools.
Types of analysis:
preliminary analysis of hazards (Mr).
systematic analysis of hazards (SAN)
pidsystemnyy hazards analysis (SAN)
hazard analysis works and services (ANRO)
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Methods and techniques used in the analysis:
Analysis of damages and the resulting effect (APVE)
analysis of tree errors (ADPd)
risk analysis errors (ARP)
failures of management and risk tree (PMDR);
analysis of energy flow and impediments (APPE)
analysis of the phased approach (TNA)
hazard analysis software (Prana)
analysis of the common causes of breakage (AZPP)
causal analysis (PNA)
Event tree analysis (ADPd)
Expedient to get acquainted with the basics at least two of the above methods, namely, the preliminary analysis of hazards (PAN) and analysis of tree errors (FNA).
Preliminary analysis of hazards - a general analysis of groups of hazards present in the system, their development and recommendations for control. PAN is the first attempt in the process of security systems to identify and classify hazards that occur in the system. However, in many cases this analysis may be preceded by preparation of the preliminary list of hazards.
PAN is usually performed in the following order:
- Examine the technical characteristics of the object, system or process, and energy sources used, environment, materials, set their dangerous and harmful properties;
-Determining laws, standards, rules, which are rozpovsyudzhuyet Xia at this facility, system or process;
- Examine the technical documentation and compliance with laws, rules, principles and norms of safety;
- Make a list of hazards, which indicate rela-identified sources of hazards (systems, subsystems, components), the factors that cause damage, potentially dangerous situation, the identified deficiencies.
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In a PAN pay special attention to the presence of explosive fire and toxic substances identified components nude object where possible their presence, potentially dangerous situation of uncontrolled reactions or at excess pressure.
Once, when the system detected large objects that are dangerous, they can be considered separately and explore in more detail using other methods of analysis listed above.
There are basic questions that are necessary to answer when conducting PAN, despite the fact that some of them may be passed tysya too simple. If these questions do not consider it a risk of incomplete analysis of the safety system. All the simplicity or the evidence tends to hide some level of hidden dangers. Basic questions that need to be resolved include the following:
Ø a process / system analyzed?
Ø or involved in this system, people?
Ø that the system should certainly be done?
Ø what the system should never do?
Ø Are there standards, rules, rules relating to the System?
Ø or used the system before?
Ø that the system produces?
Ø items included in the system?
Ø items removed from the system?
Ø that can cause danger?
Ø How is this occurrence?
Ø what and where are the sources of and obstacles to energy?
Ø Is there a critical time for the safety of operations?
Ø What are the dangers inherent in the system?
Ø How can controls be improved?
Ø or accept the leadership of this control?
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Analysis of tree errors (FNA) is considered one of the most useful analytical tools them in the process of system security, especially when assessing the extremely complex and detailed systems. Because it uses deductive logic method (ie post-povo moving from general to partial), it is very useful in the study of possible conditions that may lead to undesirable consequences, or in any way affect these outcomes. As most professional engineers for safety, with experience of investigations of accidents, adverse events rarely occur under the influence of only one factor. Because of this error in the analysis tree in the security system adverse events attributed to the final event. This - the total, or known, the result of a possible series of events, the nature of which may or may not be known until an investigation.
Although FNA is primarily a tool for the analysis of errors, it can also use tovuvatys to assess the necessary actions that would advance the desired event. Building the tree that describes all events that must happen to the final event takes place, the analyst can use FNA as a method for establishing a foundation of industrial safety program.
To set up the build tree error, the analyst must first possess a broad knowledge of the system or process research.
Create a tree bugs starts with defining the final event. This event may have a broad and general nature - failure or damage to the system, or narrow and specific, when a disturbed functioning of the component X. This final event will be located at the top of the tree bugs, and all subsequent events that lead to the front, there will be a branch on the tree.
Final part.
The lecture contained very important issues concerning the identification of hazards, quantitative characteristics of hazards, criteria for selecting measures to eliminate hazards. All of the analytical methods invoked in the system "man - machine - environment".
Knowing the dangers, harmful, dangerous and damaging factors, the development process hazards can make informed decisions on the operations (actions) in the domestic environment or at work to ensure life safety.
Associate Professor of Life Safety
Candidate of Military Sciences, professor RV HRASCHEVSKYY
