Если проведенный выше анализ не лишен достоинств, значит, перед нами новый подход к проведению обще- ственно-научного исследования. Существующий массив знаний в общественных науках может быть трансформирован с помощью новых концептуальных рамок, меняющих само наше мышление традиционных проблем экономики, политической науки, социологии, антропологии и истории. Эта рамка возникает из прицельного рассмотрения вопроса о роли насилия в формировании социальных порядков, институтов и организаций, а также в их развитии со временем. Наши рекомендации для новых исследований подразумевают более глубокое, чем раньше, понимание насилия, институтов, организаций и верований в естественных государствах.
Мы уже достигли некоторого прогресса в понимании институтов и организаций, но нам еще предстоит проделать значительную работу для уяснения политики естественных государств, а также взаимосвязи институтов и организаций, лежащей в основе любого социального порядка, то есть как порядка естественного государства, так и порядка открытого доступа. Кроме того, предстоит проделать еще немалую работу для достижения более глубокого понимания взаимозависимости формальных правил, неформальных норм и правоприменения, которые совокупно определяют работу всей институциональной рамки.
Каждое общество развивается по уникальному сценарию, поэтому для глубокого понимания трансформаций нужно избегать широких обобщений и фокусироваться на осмыслении деталей культурного наследия этого конкретного общества. Политика, которая на Западе привела к созданию открытого доступа, не может быть напрямую использована для обеспечения перехода тех обществ, которые пока еще находятся в ситуации ограниченного доступа [248]. Мир постоянно меняется, и наши представления о том, как функционируют общества, также подвержены изменениям, обусловленным новыми тенденциями и переменами. Мир, который творится нами сегодня, не похож ни на один из тех, что существовали до этого. Готовы ли мы к тому, чтобы понять его, к тому, чтобы иметь с ним дело? Нам будет куда проще, если мы осознаем границы человеческого понимания и станем поддерживать институты, способствующие адаптивной эффективности.
Эти ограничения вполне применимы и к тем концептуальным рамкам, которые были намечены нами в данной книге. Эта рамка уже устарела под напором текущих событий. И все же пришло самое время переосмыслить накопленный за два последние столетия опыт; время признать, что общества открытого доступа — это не просто слегка улучшенные разновидности тех обществ, которые им предшествовали. Тогда как истоки перехода Запада коренятся в XVIII в. (и тех веках, что были до этого), события, которые трансформировали эти общества и привели к образованию нового социального порядка, регулируемого совершенно иной логикой, произошли именно в середине XIX в. С тех самых пор лишь относительно небольшое число обществ и небольшой процент населения мира смогли осуществить переход к открытому доступу. Развитие порядка открытого доступа не только позволило этим обществам достичь мира и изобилия, но также создать институты и организации, благодаря которым насилие стало гораздо более эффективным. Внимание к комплексным переплетениям убеждений, институтов и организаций должно открыть перед нами возможности серьезных исследований самих истоков насилия. Более ясное понимание двух социальных порядков— которые были и которые есть сейчас — это необходимое условие понимания того, куда мы направляемся. Таков вызов, который бросает нам будущее.
Библиография
Андерсон, Бенедикт. (2001). Воображаемые сообщества. Размышления об истоках и распространении национализма. М.: Канон- Пресс-Ц.
Асемоглу, Дарон и Джеймс Робинсон. (2011). Экономические истоки диктатуры и демократии. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ.
Бейлин, Бернард. (2010). Идеологические истоки Американской революции. М.: Новое издательство.
Блок, Марк. (2003). Феодальное общество. М.: Издательство им. Сабашниковых.
Вебер, Макс. (1990). Избранные произведения. М.: Прогресс.
Виноградов, П. Г. (2010). Средневековое поместье в Англии. М.: Либ- роком.
Гегель, Г. В. Ф. (1990). Философия права. М.: Мысль.
Геллиер, Эрнест. (1991). Нации и национализм. М.: Прогресс.
Геллнер, Эрнест. (2004). Условия свободы. М.: Московская школа политических исследований.
Даль, Роберт Аллан. (2010). Полиархия. Участие и оппозиция. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ.
Дюверже, Морис. (2000). Политические партии. М.: Академический проект.
Косминский, Евгений. (1956). Исследования по аграрной истории Англии XIII века. М.: Изд. Академии наук СССР.
Левитт, Стивен Д. и Стивен Д. Дабнер. (2007). Фрикономика. Мнение экономиста-диссидента о неожиданных связях между событиями и явлениями. М.: Вильяме.
Ливий, Тит. (1989). История Рима от основания города. Т. 1. М.: Наука.
Макиавелли, Никколо. (2001). Государь: Сочинения. М.: ЭКСМО; Харьков: Фолио.
Мак-Нил, Уильям. (2008). В погоне за мощью: технология, вооруженная сила и общество в XI–XX веках. М.: Территория будущего.
Норт, Дуглас. (1997). Институты, институциональные изменения и функционирование экономики. М.: Начала.
Норт, Дуглас. (2010). Понимание процесса экономических изменений. М.: Издательский дом ГУ-ВШЭ.
Олсон, Мансур. (1995). Логика коллективных действий: Общественные блага и теория групп. М.: Фонд Экономической Инициативы.
Олсон, Мансур. (1998). Возвышение и упадок народов. Экономический рост, стагфляция, социальный склероз. Новосибирск: ЭКОР.
Олсон, Мансур. (2010). Диктатура, демократия и развитие Экономическая политика. № 1. С. 167–183.
Патнэм, Роберт. (1996). Чтобы демократия сработала. М.: Ad Маг- ginem.
Пшеворский, Адам. (2000). Демократия и рынок. Политические и экономические реформы в Восточной Европе и Латинской Америке. М.: РОССПЭН.
Скиннер, Квентин. (2006). Свобода до либерализма. СПб.: Европейский университет в Санкт-Петербурге.
Смит, Адам. (2007). Исследование о природе и причинах богатства народов. М.: ЭКСМО.
Сото, Эрнандо де. (1995) Иной путь: Невидимая революция в третьем мире. М.: Catallaxy.
Сото, Эрнандо де. (2001). Загадка капитала: Почему капитализм торжествует на Западе и терпит поражение во всем остальном мире. М.: Олимп-Бизнес.
Тилли, Чарльз. (2009). Принуждение, капитал и европейские государства. 990-1992 гг. М.: Территория будущего.
Токвилъ, Алексис де. (1992). Демократия в Америке. М.: Прогресс.
Уильямсон, Оливер. (1996). Экономические институты капитализма. СПб.: Лениздат.
Фукуяма, Фрэнсис. (2004). Доверие: социальные добродетели и путь к процветанию. М.: ACT.
Шеллинг, Томас. (2007). Стратегия конфликта. М.: ИРИС ЭН..
Шифман, Илья. (1990). Цезарь Август. Л.: Наука.
Шумпетер, Йозеф. (1995). Капитализм, социализм и демократия. М.: Экономика.
Юм, Давид. (1996). Сочинения. Т. 2. М.: Мысль.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2001). The colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review, 91 (5), 1369–1401.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117 (4), 1231–1294.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2005). Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth. In P.Aghion and S.Durlauf (Eds, Handbook of economic growth (pp.385–472). New York: North Holland.
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. A., and Yared, Pierre. (2007, August). Reevaluating the modernization hypothesis. NBER Working Paper No. 13334.
Acemoglu, I)., and Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 115 (4), 1167–1199.
Acemoglu, D., and Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic origins of dictatorship and democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Adams, Willi Paul. (1980). The First American constitutions. (Rita Kim- ber and Robert Kimber, Trans.). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Aldrich, John H. (1995). Why parties: The origin and transformation of political parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Alesina, Alberto, and Spolaore, Enrico. (2003). The size of nations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Allen, Robert C. (1992). Enclosure and the yeoman. New York: Oxford University Press.
Alston, LeeJ., and Feme, Joseph. (1985). Labor costs, paternalism, and loyalty in southern agriculture: A constraint on the growth of the welfare state. Journal of Economic History, XLV (1), 95-117.
AndOTora, Benedict. (2006 [1983]). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. New York: Verso Books.
Anderson, Fred. (2000). Crucible of war. New York: Vintage Books.
Anderson, R.D. (1977). France 1870–1914: Politics and society. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Annals of Congress. (1834). Published as The debates and proceedings in the Congress of the United States with an appendix. Washington: Gales and Seaton. From Library of 273
Congress collection A century of lawmaking: Annals ofCongress, http:// lcweb2.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwaclink. html.
Bailyn, Bernard. (1965). Pamphlets of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bailyn, Bernard. (1967). The ideological origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bailyn, Bernard. (1968). The origins of Am eric an politics. New York: Vintage Books.
Bailyn, Bernard. (2004). To begin the world anew: The genius and ambiguities of the American founders. New York: Vintage Books.
Ballard, A. (1913). British borough charters, 1042–1216. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ballard, A., and Tait,J. (1923). British borough charters, 1216–1307. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baloyra, Enrique А. (1986). Public opinion and support for the regime: 1973-83. In John D. Martz and DavidJ. Myers (Eds, Venezuela: The democratic experience, rev. ed. New York: Praeger).
Bandy, Matthew S. (2004). Fissioning, scalar stress, and social evolution in early village societies. American Anthropologist, 106 (2), 322–333.
Banning, Lance. (1978). Thejeffersonian persuasion. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Barro, RobertJ. (1979). On the determination of the public debt. Journal of Political Economy, 87 (5), 940–971.
Barro, RobertJ. (1996). Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth, 1 (1), 1-27.
Barro, RobertJ. (1999). Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 107 (6 part 2): 158–183.
Barzel, Yoram. (2001). A theory of the state. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bates, RobertH. (2001). Prosperity and violence: The political economy of development. New York: W. W. Norton.
Bates, Robert H. (2008). When things fell apart: State failure in late century Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bates, RobertH., Greif, Avner, and Singh, Smita. (2002). Organizing violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46 (5), 599–628.
Baumol, WilliamJ. (2002). The free-market innovation machine: Analyzing the growth miracle of capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bean,J. M. W. (1989). From lord to patron: Lordship in late medieval England. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bean, Richard. (1973). War and the birth of the nation state. Journal of Economic History, 33 (1): 203–221.
Bell, H. E. (1953). An introduction to the history and records of the court of wards & liveries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bellamy, J. G. (1973). Crime and public order in England in the later Middle Ages. Toronto: University ofToronto Press.
Bellamy, J. G. (1989). Bastard feudalism and the law. Portland, OR: Are- opagitica Press.
Benson, Lee. (1961). The concept ofJacksonian democracy: New York as a test case. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Berdan, Frances. (1982). The Aztecs of central Mexico: An imperial society. San Francisco: Holt, Reinhardt, and Wilson.
Berdan, Frances. (1985). Markets in the economy of Aztec Mexico. In Stuart Plattner (Ed.), Markets and marketing. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Berdan, Frances. (1987). The economics of Aztec luxury trade and tribute. In Elizabeth Hill Boone (Ed.). The Aztec templo mayor. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection.
Berdan, Frances. (1996). The tributary provinces. In Michael E.Smith and Frances F. Berdan (Eds, Aztec imperial strategies (pp. 47–84)). Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection.
Berdan, Frances F., Blanton, Richard E., Boone, Elizabeth H., Hodge, Mary G., Smith, MichaelE, and Umberger, Emily. (1996). Aztec imperial strategies. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection.
Berman, HaroldJ. (1983). Law and revolution: The formation of the Western legal tradition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Berman, Sheri. (2006). The primacy of politics: Social democracy and the making of Europe’s twentieth century. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bernard, G. W. (1985). The power of the early Tudor nobility: A study of the Fourth and Fifth Earls of Shrewsbury. Brighton: Harvester Press.
Bertrand, Marianne, Djankov, Simeon, Hanna, Rema, and Mullainathan, Sen- dhil. (2007). Obtaining a driving license in India: An experimental approach to studying corruption. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 122 (4), 1639–1676.
Bhagwati, Jagdish N. (1982). Directly unproductive profit-seeking (DUP) activities. Journal of Political Economy, 90 (5): 988-1002.
Blanton, Richard E. (1996). The basin of Mexico market system and the growth of empire. In Michael E. Smith and Frances F. Berdan (Eds, Aztec imperial strategies (pp. 47–84)). Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection.
Blanton, Richard E., and Fargher, Lane F. (2008). Collective action in the formation of premodern states. New York: Springer.
Bloch, Marc. (1961). Feudal society, 2 volumes. (L. A. Many on, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Blum, Jerome. (1964). Lord and peasant in Russia from the ninth to the nineteenth century. New York: Atheneum.
Bodenhorn, Howard. (2006). Bank chartering and political corruption in ante-bellum New York: Free banking as reform. In Edward Glaeser and Claudia Goldin (Eds, Corruption and reform. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Boehm, Christopher. (1999). Hierarchy in the forest: The evolution of egalitarian behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bogart, Dan. (2005a). Did turnpike trusts increase transport investment in eighteenth-century England? Journal of Economic History, 65 (2), 439–468.
Bogart, Dan. (2005b). Turnpike trusts and the transportation revolution in eighteenth-century England. Explorations in Economic History, 42 (4), 479–508.
Boix, Carles. (2003). Democracy and redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bonney, Richard. (1981). The king’s debts: Finance and politics in France, 1589–1661. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bossenga, Gail. (1991). The politics of privilege: Old regime and revolution in Lille. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brantley, William H. (1961). Banking in Alabama, 1816–1860, 2 volumes. Birmingham: Birmingham Printing Co.
Brennan, Geoffrey, and Buchanan, James M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Brumfiel, Elizabeth. (1987). Elite and utilitarian crafts in the Aztec state. In Elizabeth Brumfiel and Timothy Earle (Eds), Specialization, exchange, and complex societies (pp. 102–118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Brundage, Burr Cartwright. (1972). A rain of darts: The Mexica Aztecs. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Buchanan, James М., Tollison, Robert D., and Tulloch, Gordon. (1980). Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station: Texas A&M University.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Smith, Alastair, Siverson, Randolph М., and Morrow, James D. (2003). The logic ofpolitical survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Bulmer-Thomas, Ivor. (1953). The party system in Great Britain. London: Phoenix House.
Bulmer-Thomas, Ivor. (1965). The growth of the British party system. London: John Baker.
Burton, Michael, Gunther, Richard, and Higley, John. (1992). Introduction: Elite transformations and democratic regimes. In John Higley and Richard Gunther (Eds), Elites and democratic consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Butteifield, Herbert. (1965 [1931]). The Whig interpretation of history. New York: W.W. Norton.
Cadman, John W. (1949). The corporation in New Jersey: Business and politics, 1791–1875. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Callender, Guy Stevens. (1902). The early transportation and banking enterprises of the states in relation to the growth of corporations. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 17 (1), 111–162.
Campbell, Bruce M.S. (2000). English seigniorial agriculture, 1250–1450. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Campbell, Peter. (1958). French electoral systems and elections since 1789. Hamden, CT: Archon Books.
Carlos, Ann, Neal, Larry, and Wandscheider, Kirsten. (2009). The origins of the national debt: The financing and re-financing of the War of Spanish Succession. Working Paper.
Carrasco, Pedro. (1999). The Tenochca empire of ancient Mexico: The triple alliance of Tenochtitlan, Tetzcoco, and Tlacopan. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Caso, Alfonso. (1958). The Aztecs: People of the sun. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Chang, Kwang-chih. (1983). Art, myth, and ritual: The path to political authority in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Clanchy, М. T. (1965). The treatise on the laws and customs of the realm of England commonly called Glanvill. (G.D.G.Hall, Trans, and Ed.). London: Nelson.
Clark, Gregory. (2005). The condition of the working-class in England, 1209–2004. Journal of Political Economy, 113 (6), 1307–1340.
Clark, Gregory. (2007a). The long march of history: Farm wages, population growth, and economic growth, England 1209–1869. Economic History Review, 60 (1), 97-136.
Clark, Gregory. (2007b). A farewell to alms: A brief economic history of the world. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Clark, Gregory. (2007c). A review of Avner Griefs Institutions and the path to the modern economy: Lessons from medieval trade. Journal ofEconomic Literature, XLV (3), 727–743.
Clark, J. C.D. (1985). English society 1688–1832. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Coates, Dennis, Heckelman, Jac C., and Wilson, Bonnie. (2007). The determinants ofinterests group formation. Public Choice, 133, 377–391.
Cole, ArthurH. (1970). The committee on research in economic history: An historical sketch. Journal ofEconomic History, 20 (4), 723–741.
Coleman, James S. (1974). Power and the structure of society. New York: W.W.Norton.
Coleman, James S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Collins, James В. (1995). The state in early modern France. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Conrad, Geoffrey W., and D'emarest, Arthur A. (1984). Religion and empire: The dynamics of Aztec and Inca expansionism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Coss, PR (1989). Bastard feudalism revisited. Past and Present, 125, 27–64.
Cooper, J. P. (1983). Land, men, and beliefs: Studies in early modern history. (G.E.AylmerandJ.S.Morrill, Eds). London: Hambledon Press.
Сох, Gary. (1987). The efficient secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cox, Gary. (1997). Making votes count: Strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crafts, N.F.R. (1998). Forging ahead and falling behind: The rise and relative decline of the first industrial nation. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (2), 193–210.
Creighton, Andrew L. (1990). The emergence of incorporation as a legal form for organizations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University.
Dahl, Robert A. (1962). Who governs? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Dahl, RobertA. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Davis, John P. (1961). Corporations: A study of the development of the origin and development of great business combinations and their relation to the authority of the state. New York: Capricorn.
Davis, Joseph Stancliffe. (1917). Essays in the earlier history of American corporations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Davis, Lance, Easterlin, Richard A., and Parker, William N., et al. (1972). American economic growth: An economist’s history of the United States. New York: Harper&Row.
De Soto, Hernando. (1989). The other path: The economic answer to terrorism. New York: Harper & Row.
De Soto, Hernando. (2000). The mystery of capital: Why capitalism succeeds in the West and fails everywhere else. New York: Basic Books.
de Vries,Jan, and Van Der Woude, Ad. (1997). The first modern economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dickson, P. G.M. (1967). The financial revolution in England: A study in the development ofpublic credit, 1688–1756. London: Macmillan.
Dietz, Frederick C. (1964). English public finance, 1485–1641. New York: Barnes& Noble.
Digby, Kenelm Edward. (1897). An introduction to the history of the law of real property. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dodd, Edwin Merrick. (1954). American business corporations until 1860; with special reference to Massachusetts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Doyle, William. (1996). Venality: The sale of offices in eighteenth-century France. New York: Oxford University Press.
Drelichman, Mauricio, and Voth, Hansjoachim. (2008). The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Spain’s fiscal position,
1598. University of British Columbia Working Paper.
Drew, Katherine Fisher. (1991). The laws of the Salian Franks. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Duff, P. W. (1938). Personality in private law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dunbar, Robin. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dunlavy, Colleen A. (2004). From citizens to plutocrats: Nineteenth-cen- tury shareholder voting rights and theories of the corporation. In. Kenneth Lipartito and David B.Sicilia (Eds), Constructing corporate America: History, politics, and culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Duverger, Maurice. (1959). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. (Barbara and Robert North, Trans.). London: Methuen.
Earle, Timothy. (1997). How chiefs come to power. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Earle, Timothy. (2003). Bronze Age economics: The beginnings of political economies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Eggertsson, Thramn. (2005). Imperfect institutions: Possibilities and limits of reform. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Elton, G. R. (1977). Reform and reformation: England 1509–1558. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Elton, G.R (1991). England under the Tudors. New York: Routledge.
Engerman, Stanley E, and Sokolojf, Kenneth L. (2005). Colonialism, inequality, and long-run paths of development. NBER Working Paper 11057.
Ertman, Thomas. (1997). Birth of the leviathan: Building states and regimes in early modern Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Esarey, Logan. (1918). A history of Indiana: From its exploration to 1860. Indianapolis: B. F. Bowen and Company.
EstevezAbe, Margarita, Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David. (2001). Social protection and the formation of skills: A reinterpretation of the welfare state. In Peter A. Hall and David Soskice (Eds), Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Evans, George Heberton. (1948). Business incorporations in the United States, 1800–1943. New York: NBER.
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. (1940). The Nuer. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Fargher, Lane F., and Blanton, Richard E. (2007). Revenue, voice, and public goods in three premodern states. Comparative Studies in Society and History, 49 (4), 848–882.
Fearon, James D. (2006). Self-enforcing democracy. Working Paper, Stanford University.
Feinman, Gary М., and Marcus, Joyce. (1998). Archaic states. Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
Feinstein, Charles H. (1998). Pessimism perpetuated: Real wages and the standard of living in Britain during and after the Industrial Revolution. Journal of Economic History, 58 (3), 625–658.
Ferejohn, John, Rakove, Jack N., and Riley, Jonathan. (2001). Constitutional culture and democratic rule. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ferguson, EJames. (1961). The power of the purse. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Ferguson, Niall. (2002). The cash nexus: Money and power in the modern world. New York: Basic Books.
Figgis, John Neville. (1923). Studies of political thought from Gerson to Grotius 1414–1625, second edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Figgis, John Neville. (1960). Political thought from Gerson to Grotius: 1414–1625. New York: Harper and Brothers.
Fishback, Price V, and Kantor, Shawn Everett. (2000). A prelude to the welfare state: The origins ofworkers’ compensation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fogel, Robert William. (2004). The escape from hunger and premature death, 1700–2100: Europe, America, and the third world. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Foord, Archibalds. (1964). His majesty’s opposition: 1714–1830. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ford, Thomas. (1946). A history of Illinois from its commencement as a state in 1818 to 1847. Vol. II. Chicago: Lakeside Press.
Fortescue, SirJohn. (1885). The governance of England (C. Plummer, Ed.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Freedeman, Charles E. (1961). The Conseil d’Etat in modern France. New York: Columbia University Press.
Freedeman, Charles E. (1979). Joint-stock enterprise in France, 1807–1867: From privileged company to modern corporation. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Freedeman, Charles E. (1993). The triumph of corporate capitalism in France, 1867–1914. Rochester: University of Rochester Press.
Freid, Morton H. (1967). The evolution of political society: An essay in political anthropology. New York: Random House.
Fukuyama, Francis. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York: Free Press.
Galbraith,John Kenneth. (1956). American capitalism. New York: Houghton Mifflin.
Gallman, Robert К, and Wallis, John Joseph. (Eds). (1992). American economic growth and standards of living before the Civil War. Chicago: NBER/University of Chicago Press.
Ganshof, Francois Louis. (1968). Frankish institutions under Charlemagne. (Bryceand Mary Lyon, Trans.). Providence: Brown University Press.
Garrett, Geoffrey. (1998). Partisan politics in the global economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gay, Peter. (1966). The Enlightenment. Volume 1: The rise of modern paganism. New York: W. W. Norton.
Gay, Peter. (1969). The Enlightenment. Volume 2: The science of freedom. New York: W.W.Norton.
Geary, Patrick J. (1988). Before France and Germany: The creation and transformation of the Merovingian world. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gellner, Ernest. (1983). Nations and nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gellner, Ernest. (1994). Conditions of liberty: Civil society and its rivals. New York: Penguin Press.
Gierke, Otto. (1958 [1900]). Political theories ofthe MiddleAge. (F. W. Maitland. Trans.). Boston: Beacon Press. (Originally published by Cambridge University Press.)
Glaeser, Edward, LaPorta, Rafael, Lopes-de-Silanes, Florencio, and Shleifer, Andrei. (2004). Do institutions cause growth? Journal ofEconomic Growth, 9 (3), 271–303.
Glaeser, Edward, and Shleifer, Andre. (2002). Legal origins. Quarterly Journal ofEconomics, 117, 1193–1230.
Goldman, Marshall. (2008). Petrostate: Putin, power, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Goodrich, Carter. (1960). Government promotion of American canals and railroads. New York: Columbia University Press.
Gray, Charles Montgomery. (1963). Copyhold, equity, and the common law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gray, H.L. (1934). Incomes from land in England in 1436. English Historical Review, 49 (196), 607–639.
Greif Avner. (2006). Institutions and the path to the modern economy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Guinnane, Timothy W., Harris, Ron, Lamoreaux, Naomi R, and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent. (2007). Putting the corporation in its place. Enterprise and Society, 8 (3), 687–729.
Gunn, L.Ray. (1988). The decline of authority: Public economic policy and political development in New York, 1800–1860. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Habakkuk, H.J. (1958). The market for monastic property, 1539–1603. Economic History Review, New Series, 10 (3), 362–380.
Habakkuk, H.J. (1965). Landowners and the Civil War. Economic History Review, New Series, 18 (1), 130–151.
Haber, Stephen H. (2006). Authoritarian government. In Barry R. Weingast and Donald Wittman (Eds) Handbook of political economy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Haber, Stephen H., Klein, Herbert S., Maurer, Noel, and Middtebrook, Kevin J. (2008). Mexico since 1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haber, Stephen H., Razo, Armando, and Maurer, Noel. (2003). The politics of property rights: Political instability, credible commitments, and economic growth in Mexico, 1976–1929. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haggard, Stephan, and Kaufman, Robert. (1995). The political economy of democratic transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hamilton, Alexander, Jay, John, and Madison, James, (n. d. [1787-88]). The Federalist. New York: Modern Library.
Handlin, Oscar, and Handlin, Mary Flug. (1969). Commonwealth: A study of the role of government in the American economy: Massachusetts, 1774–1861. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Hanley, David. (2002). Party, society, and government: Republican democracy in France. New York: Berghahn Books.
Harris, Ron. (1994). The Bubble Act: Its passage and effect on business organization. Journal of Economic History, 54 (3), 610–627.
Harris, Ron. (1997). Political economy, interest groups, legal institutions, and the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825. Economic History Review, 50 (4), 675–696.
Harris, Ron. (2000). Industrializing English law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hartz, Louis. (1948). Economic policy and democratic thought: Pennsylvania, 1776–1860. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
Hassig, Ross. (1988). Aztec warfare: Imperial expansion and political control. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Hayek, Friederich A. (1952). The sensory order. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, Friederich A. (1960). The constitution of liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press. Heath, Milton S. (1954). Constructive liberalism: The role of the state in economic development in Georgia to 1860, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Heather, Peter. (1996). The Goths. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
Heather, Peter. (2006). The fall of the Roman Empire. New York: Oxford University Press.
Heckleman, Jac C., and Wallis, John Joseph. (1997). Railroads and property taxes. Explorations in Economic History, 34 (1), 77–99.
Hegel, G.W.F. (1991 [1820]). Elements of the philosophy of right. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Heston, Alan, Summers, Robert, and Aten, Bettina (2006, September). Penn world table version 6.2. Philadelphia: Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income, and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
Hicks, Michael (1995). Bastard feudalism. NewYork: Longman.
Historical statistics of the United States. (2006). Richard Sutch and Susan Carter (Eds). NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Hodge, Mary G. (1996). Political organization of the central provinces. In Michael E.Smith and Frances F.Berdan (Eds), Aztec imperial strategies (pp. 13–46). Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 1996. Hodges, Richard. (1989). Dark age economics: The origins oftown and trade A. D. 600-1000. London: Gerald Duckworth & Company.
Hodges, Richard, and Whitehouse, David. (1983). Mohammed, Charlemagne, & the origins of Europe: Archeology and the Pirenne hypothesis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Hoffman, Philip Т., and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent. (2000). New work in French economic history. French Historical Studies, 23 (3), 439–453.
Hofstadter, Richard. (1969). The idea of a party system. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Holmes, George. (1957). The estates of the higher nobility in fourteenth — century England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Holt, MichaelF. (1978). The political crisis ofthe 1850s. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Holt, MichaelF. (1999). The rise and fall of the American Whig party: Jacksonian politics and the onset of the CivilWar. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hoyle, R. W. (Ed.). (1992). The estates ofthe English crown, 1558–1640. NewYork: Cambridge University Press,
Hughes, J. R. T. (1976). Social control in the colonial economy. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Hughes, J.R T. (1977). What difference did the beginning make? American Economic Review, 67 (1), 15–20.
Hume, David. (1987 [1777]). Essays: Moral, political, and literary. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Hurst, James Willard (1964). Law and the conditions of freedom in the nineteenth-century United States, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Hurst, James Willard. (1980). The legitimacy ofthe business corporation. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.
Hurstfield, Joel (1949). Lord Burghley as master of the court of wards,
1598. Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fourth Series, 31, 95-114.
Hurstfield, Joel. (1953). Corruption and reform under Edward VI and Mary: The example of wardship. English Historical Review, 68 (266), 22–36.
Hurstfield, Joel. (1955). The profits of fiscal feudalism, 1541–1602. Economic History Review, New Series, 8 (1), 53–61.
Iversen, Torben. (2005). Capitalism, democracy, and welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Iversen, Torben, and Soskice, David. (2001). An asset theory of social policy preferences. American Political Science Review, 95 (4): 875–893.
Jha, Saumitra. (2008, August), «Shares, coalition formation and political development: evidence from 17th century England», Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 2005.
John, Eric. (1960). Land tenure in early England: A discussion of some problems. Welwyn Garden City: Leicester University Press.
Johnson, Allen W., and Earle, Timothy. (2000). The evolution of hum an societies, 2nd edition. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Johnson, Gregory A. (1982). Organizational structure and scalar stress. In Colin Renfrew, Michael J. Rowlands, and Barbara Abbott Seg- raves (Eds), Theory and explanation in archaeology. New York: Academic Press.
Jones, Eric. (1981). The European miracle. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, J. R. (1972). The revolution of 1688 in England. New York: W. W. Norton.
Kantorowicz, Ernst H. (1997 [1957]). The king’s two bodies: A study in mediaeval political theology. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Katzenstein, Peter. (1985). Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Keefer, Philip. (2004). Democratization and clientelism: Why are young democracies badly governed? Development Research Group, World Bank Working Paper Series No. 3594.
Keefer, Philip, and Vlaicu, Razvan. (2005, January). Democracy, credibility and clientelism. World Bank Working Paper 3472.
Keely, Lawrence H. (1996). War before civilization. New York: Oxford University Press.
Keller, Morton. (2007). America’s three regimes: A new political history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kelly, Robert L. (1995). The foraging spectrum: Diversity in hunter-gather- er lifeways. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Kennedy, David M. (1999). Freedom from fear: The American people in depression and war, 1929–1945. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kettering, Sharon. (1986). Patrons, brokers, and clients in seventeenth-cen- tury France. New York: Oxford University Press.
Keyssar, Alexander. (2000). The right to vote: The contested history of democracy in America. New York: Basic Books.
Khan, Mushtaq. (2004). State failure in developing countries and institutional reform strategies. Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics — Europe 2003. Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank.
Khan, Mushtaq. (2005). Markets, states, and democracy: Patron — client networks and the case for democracy in developing countries. Democratization, 12 (5), 704–724.
Khan, Mushtaq. (2006, November 11–12). Governance and development. Paper presented at the Workshop on Government and Development, World Bank, Dhaka.
Khan, Mushtaq, andJomo, KS. (2000). Rents, rent-seeking, and economic development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kishlansky, Mark A. (1986). Parliamentary selection: social and political choice in early modern England. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Klerman, Daniel. (2007). Jurisdictional competition and the evolution of the common law. University of Chicago Law Review, 74 (Fall), 1179–1226.
Knack, Steven, and Keefer, Philip. (1995). Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternative measures. Economics and Politics, 7 (3), 207–227.
Knack, Steven, and Keefer, Philip. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff: A cross-country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), 1251–1288.
Kosminsky, E. (1931). The hundred rolls of 1279-80 as a source for English agrarian history. Economic History Review, 3 (1), 16–44.
Kramer, GeraldH. (1971). Short-term fluctuations in U. S. voting behavior. American Political Science Review, 65 (1), 131–143.
Kramnick, Isaac. (1968). Bolingbroke and his circle: The politics of nostalgia in the age of Walpole. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kreuzer, Marcus. (2001). Institutions and innovation: Voters, parties, and interest groups in the consolidation of democracy — France and Germany, 1870–1939. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Krueger, Anne O. (1990). The political economy of controls: American sugar. In M. Scott and D. Lai (Eds), Public choice and economic development: Essays in honor of Ian Little. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Kruman, Marc W. (1997). Between authority and liberty: State constitution making in revolutionary America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Knrov, Andre)’. (2008). Anatomy of crisis: Political aspects of macroeconomic policies and reforms in Russia, 1994–2004. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stanford University.
Kwass, Michael (2000). Privilege and the politics of taxation in eight- eenth-century France. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lamoreaux, Naomi. (2004). Partnerships, corporations, and the limits on contractual freedom in U.S. history: An essay in economics, law, and culture. In Kenneth Lipartito and David B.Sicilia (Eds), Constructing corporate America: History, politics, and culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lamoreaux, Naomi, and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent. (2004, February). Legal regime and business’s organizational choice. NBER Working PaperNo. 10288.
Lamoreaux, Naomi R, and Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent. (2005). Legal regime and contractual flexibility: A comparison of business’s organizational choices in France and the United States during the era of industrialization. American Law and Economics Review, 7 (1), 28–61.
Landau, Martin. (1969). Redundancy, rationality, and the problem of duplication and overlap. Public Administration Review, 29 (4), 346–358.
Landes, David. (1999). The wealth and poverty of nations. New York: W. W. Norton.
La Porta, Rafael, Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, Andre, and Vishny, Robert. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6), 1113–1155.
Larson, John Lauritz. (2001). Internal improvement: National public works and the promise of popular government in the early United States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Lebergott, Stanley. (1984). The Americans: An economic record. NewYork: W.W.Norton.
LeBlanc, Steven A. (2003). Constant battles: The myth of the peaceful, noble savage. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Leggett, William. (1984). Demo era tick editorials: Essays in Jacksonian political economy. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
Leon-Portilla, Miguel (196S). Aztec thought and culture. (Jack Emory Davis, Trans.). Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Leonard, Gerald. (2002), The invention of party politics: Federalism, popular sovereignty, and constitutional development inJacksonian Illinois. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Levi, Margaret. (1988). Of rule and revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Levi, Margaret. (1997). Consent, dissent, and patriotism. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Levitt, Steven D., and Dubner, Stephen J. (2005). Freakonomics: A rogue economist explains the hidden side of everything. New York: William Morrow.
Lindert, PeterH. (2004). Growing public: Social spending and economic growth since the eighteenth century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. American Political Science Review, 53 (1), 69-105.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1963). Political man: The social bases of politics. Garden City: Anchor Books.
Lively, Robert A. (1955). The American system: A review article. Business History Review, 29 (1), 81–96.
Livy. (1998). Therise of Rome, Books 1–5. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lockhart, James. (1992). The Nahuas after the conquest: A social and cultural history ofthe Indians of Central Mexico. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
LondreganJohn B., and Poole, Keith. (1990). Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. World Politics, 42 (2), 151–183.
Lutz, DonaldS. (1988). The origins of American constitutionalism. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. (1854). The History of Florence. London: Bohn.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. (1988). The prince. (Quentin Skinner and Russell Price, Eds). NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. (1996). Discourses on Livy. (Harvey C. Mansfield and Nathan Tarcov, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Maier, Pauline. (1993). The revolutionary origins of the American corporation. William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 50 (1), 51–84.
Maitland, F.W. (1963 [1908]). The constitutional history of England. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Maitland, F.W. (1968 [1909]). The forms of action at common law. In A.J. Chaytor and W.J. Whittaker (Eds), Medieval sourcebook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
Maitland, F. W. (2003). State, trust, and corporation. (David Runciman and Magnus Ryan, Eds), New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mares, Isabela. (2003). The politics of social risk: Business and welfare state development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Margo, Robert A, (2000). Wages and labor in the United States, 1820 to 1860. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marshall, Monty G., and Jaggers, Keith. (2005). Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2004. Arlington, VA: Center for Global Policy.
Mathias, Peter, and ОBrien, Patrick К. (1976). Taxation in Britain and France, 1715–1810: A comparison of the social and economic incidence of taxes collected for the central governments. Journal of European Economic History, 5 (3), 601–650.
McCloskey, Dierdre N. (2006). The bourgeois virtues: Ethics for an age of commerce. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCormick, Michael. (2001). Origins of the European economy: Communications and commerce A. D. 300–900. New York: Cambridge University Press.
McCormick, Richard L. (1986). The party period and public policy: American politics from the age ofJackson to the progressive era. New York: Oxford University Press.
McCoy, Drew R. (1980). Elusive republic: Political economy in Jeffersonian America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
McFarlane, K.B. (1973). The nobility of later medieval England. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
McFarlane, K.B. (1981). England in the fifteenth century. London: Ham- bledon Press.
McKee, Samuel. (1957 [1934]). Alexander Hamilton’s papers on public credit commerce and finance. New York: Liberal Arts Press (reprint of original Columbia University Press).
McNeill, William H. (1982). The pursuit of power: Technology, armed force, and society since A. D. 1000. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Meisel, Nicolas, and Ould Aoudia,Jacques. (2008, January). Is ’good govern- ance’ good develo pment strategy? Working Paper No. 58, Agence Francaise de Development.
Meltzer, Allan H., and Richard, Scott F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89 (5), 914–927.
Meyer, John W. (1994). Rationalized environments. In W.Richard Scott and John W. Meyer (Eds), Institutionalized environments and organizations. New York: Sage Publications.
Meyer, John W., Boli, John, and Thomas, George M. (1987). Ontology and rationalization in the western cultural account. In G.Thomas, J.Meyer, F.Ramirez, andJ.Boli (Eds), Institutional structure: Constituting state, society, and the individual. New York: Sage Publications.
Milgrom, Paul, and Roberts, John. (1992). Economics, organization, and management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Miller, Nathan. (1962). The enterprise of a free people: Aspects of economic development in New York State during the canal period, 1792–1838. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Milsom, S.F.C. (1969). Historical foundations of the common law. London: Butterworths.
Milsom, S.F.C. (1976). The legal framework of English feudalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Milsom, S.F.C. (2003). Natural history of the common law. New York: Columbia University Press.
Mital, Sonia. (2008). A necessary precaution: The separation of powers and political stability in America. Unpublished Working Paper, Department ofPolitical Science, Stanford University.
Mobarak, AhmedMushfiq. (2005). Democracy, volatility, and development. Review ofEconomics and Statistics, 87 (2), 348–361.
Mokyr,Joel. (1990). The lever of riches: Technological creativity and economic progress. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mokyr, Joel. (2002). The gifts of Athena: The historical origins of the knowledge economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mokyr, Joel. (2009). The enlightened economy: An economic history of Britain, 1700–1850. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Munro,J. (1977). Industrial protectionism in medieval Flanders: Urban or national? In H. A. Miskimin, D.Herlihy, and A. L. Udovitch (Eds), The medieval city. New Haven CT: Yale University Press.
Munro,J. (1990). Urban regulation and monopolistic competition in the textile industries ofthe late-medieval low countries. In E. Aerts, and J. Munro (Eds), Textiles ofthe low countries in European economic history. Studies in Social and Economic History, vol. 19. Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 41–52.
Myerson, Roger B. (2008). The autocrat’s credibility problem and foundations ofthe constitutional state. American Political Science Review, 102 (01), 125–139.
Namier; Lewis. (1957). The structure of politics and the accession of George III (second edition). New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Namier, Lewis. (1966). England in the age ofthe American revolution (second edition). New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Namier, Lewis, and Brooke, John. (1964). The House of Commons, 1754–1790. London: History ofthe Parliament Trust.
Neal, Larry. (1990). The rise of financial capitalism: International capital markets in the Age of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass C. (1961). The economic growth of the United States: 1790–1860. NewYork: W. W. Norton.
North, Douglass C. (1981). Structure and change in economic history. New York: W.W.Norton.
North, Douglass C. (1988). Institutions and economic growth: An historical introduction. In Michael A.Walker (Ed.), Freedom, democracy, and economic welfare. Canada: Fraser Institute.
North, Douglass C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, Douglass С. (2005). Understanding the process of economic change. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
North, Douglass C., SummerhiU, William, and Weingast, Barry R. (2000). Order, disorder, and economic change: Latin America vs. North America. In Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton Root (Eds), Governing for prosperity, New Haven: Yale University Press.
North, Douglass C., Wallis, JohnJoseph, Webb, Stephen B., and Weingast, Barry R (2007) Limited access orders in the developing world: Anew approach to the problems of development. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4359.
North, Douglass C., Wallis, JohnJoseph, and Weingast, Barry R. (2009). Violence, natural states, and open access orders Journal of Democracy 20 (1), 55–68.
North, Douglass C., and Weingast, Barry R. (1989). Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in 17th century England. Journal of Economic History, 49 (4), j 803–832.’
— a
Oates, Wallace. (1972). Fiscal federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace ' Jovanovich.
Oberjosiah. (2008). Democracy and knowledge: Innovation and learning in classical Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
OBrien, Patrick К. (1988). The political economy of British taxation, 1660–1815. The Economic History Review, New Series, 41 (1), 1-32.
ODonnell, Guillermo, and Schmitter, Philippe C. (1986). Transitions from’\ authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusion about uncertain democ- * racies. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Olson, Mancur. (1965). Logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Olson, Mancur. (1982). The rise and decline of nations. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Olson, Mancur. (1993). Democracy, dictatorship, and development. American Political Science Review, 87 (3), 567–575.
Parker, Geoffrey. (1996). The military revolution: Military innovation and the rise of the west, 2nd edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Patterson, Margaret, and Reiffen, David. (1990). The effect of the Bubble Act on the market for joint-stock shares. Journal of Economic History, 50 (1), 163–171.
Pederson, Jesper Strandgaard, and Dobbin, Frank. (1997). The social invention of collective actors: On the rise of organizations. American Behavioral Scientist, 40 (4), 431–443.
Perrow, Charles. (2002). Organizing America: Wealth, power, and the origins of corporate capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Persson, Torsten, and Tabellini, Guido. (2000). Political economics: Explaining economic policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Pirenne, Henri. (2001 [1954]). Mohammed and Charlemagne. Mineola, NY: Dover Press. (F. Vercauteren, Trans.). Originally published in English by George Allen and Unwin.
Pocock, J. GA. (1975). The Machiavellian moment: Florentine political thought and the Atlantic republican tradition. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pollard, A.J. (1988). The Wars ofthe Roses. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Pollock, Frederick, and Maitland, Frederic William. (1899). The history of English law before the time ofEdward I, second edition, 2 volumes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pomeranz, Kenneth. (2000). The great divergence: China, Europe, and the making ofthe modern world economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Prasad, Monica. (2006). The politics of free markets: The rise of neoliberal economic policies in Britain, France, Germany and the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Primm, James N. (1954). Economic policy in the development of a western state: Missouri, 1820–1860. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Przeworski, Adam. (1991). Democracy and the market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Przeworski, Adam, Alvarez, Michael E., Cheibub, Jose Antonio, and Limongi, Fernando. (2000). Democracy and development: Political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950–1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, Robert. (1993). Making democracy work. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, Robert. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival ofAmer- ican community. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Quinn, Stephen. (October 21, 2006). Securitization of sovereign debt: Corporations as a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism in Britain, 1688–1750. Paper delivered at the Conference on Financial History, UCLA.
Ramey, Garey, and Ramey, Valerie A. (1995). Cross-country evidence on the link between volatility and growth. American Economic Review, 85 (5), 1138–1151.
Rappaport, Roy A. (1968). Pigs for the ancestors: Ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea people. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Remini, Robert V. (1967). Andrew Jackson and the bank war: A study in the growth ofpresidential power. New York: W. W. Norton.
Remini, Robert V. (1981). Andrew Jackson: Vol. 2. The course ofAmerican freedom. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Richardson, Gary. (2001). A tale of two theories: Monopolies and craft guilds in medieval England and modern imagination. Journal of History of Economic Thought, 23 (2), 217–242.
Richardson, Gary. (2004). Guilds, laws, and markets for manufactured merchandise in late medieval England. Explorations in Economic History, 41 (1), 1-25.
Richardson, James D. (1897). A compilation of the messages and papers of the presidents. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Literature.
Riesenberg, Peter N. (1956). Inalienability of sovereignty in medieval political thought. New York: Columbia University Press.
Riker, William H. (1982a). Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Riker, William H. (1982b). The two party system and Duverger’s law: An essay in the history of political science. American Political Science Review, 76 (4), 753–766.
Rivers, TheodoreJohn. (1986). The laws of the Salic and Ripuarian Franks. New York: AMS Press.
Robinson, James. (October 21, 2006). Debt repudiation and risk premia: The North-Weingast thesis revisited. Paper delivered at the Conference on Financial History, UCLA.
Roberts, Michael. (1967). Essays in Swedish history. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Rodger, NA.M. (1986). The wooden world: An anatomy of the Georgian Navy. New York: W.W.Norton.
Rodger, N.A.M. (1997). The safeguard of the sea: A naval history of Britain, 660-1649. NewYork: W.W. Norton.
Rodger, N.A.M. (2004). The command of the ocean: A naval history of Britain, 660-1649. New York: W.W.Norton.
Rodrik, Dani. (1999). Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict and growth collapses. Journal of Economic Growth, 4 (4), 385–412.
Rodrik, Dani. (2007). One economics, many recipes: Globalization, institutions, and economic growth. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rodrik, Dani, Subramanian, A., and Trebbi, F. (2004). Institutions rule: The primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (2), 131–165.
Rogers, Clifford. (1995). The military revolution debate. Boulder, CO: Westfield Press.
Rogowski, Ronald. (1987). Trade and the variety of democratic institutions. International Organization, 41 (2), 203–223.
Rogowski, Ronald. (1989). Commerce and coalitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Root, Hilton. (1994). The fountain of privilege: Political foundations of economic markets in old regime France and England. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rosenberg, Nathan, and Birdzell, L.E. (1986). How the West grew rich. New York: Basic Books.
Rosenblum, Nancy L. (1998). Membership and morals: The personal uses of pluralism in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rostow, Walt Whitman. (1960). The stages of economic growth: A noncommunist manifesto. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Roy, William G. (1997). Socializing capital: The rise ofthe large industrial corporation in America. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rutland, Robert A. et al, (Eds). (1983). The papers ofJames Madison, vol. 14: 6 April 1791-16 March 1793, Charlottesville, Va.: University of Virginia Press, pp.157–169.
Scheiber, Harry N. (1969). Ohio canal era: A case study ofgovernment and the economy, 1820–1861. Athens, Ohio: The Ohio State University Press.
Schelling Thomas C. (1960). Strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Schultz, Kenneth A., and Weingast, Barry R. (2003). The democratic advantage: The institutional sources of state power in international competition. International Organization, 57, 3-42.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York: Harper Colophon.
Schwoerer, Lois. (1981). The declaration of rights, 1689. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Scott, J. (1917). Limitations of guild monopoly. American Historical Review, 22 (April), 586–589.
Scott, James C. (1972). Comparative political corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Scott, James C. (1987). Weapons ofthe weak. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Scott, W.Richard. (2001). Institutions and organizations, second edition. New York: Sage Publications.
Scott, William Robert. (1951 [1912]). The constitution and finance of English, Scottish and Irish joint-stock companies to 1720: 3 volumes. New York: Peter Smith. (Reprinted from the Cambridge University Press original).
Seavoy, Ronald E. (1982). The origins of the American business corporation, 1784–1855. Westport: Greenwood Press.
Service, ElmanR. (1971). Primitive social organization: An evolutionary perspective, second edition. New York: Random House.
Service, ElmanR. (1975). Origins of the state and civilization: The process of cultural evolution. NewYork: W.W. Norton.
Sheehan, Colleen А. (1992). The politics of public opinion: James Madison’s «Notes on government». The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 49 (4), 609–627.
Shin, Doh Chull. 2000. The evolution of popular support for democracy during Kim Young Sam’s government. In Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Eds), Institutional reform and democratic consolidation in Korea. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Silbey,JoelH. (1967). The transformation of American politics, 1840–1960. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Silbey, Joel H. (1985). The partisan imperative: The dynamics of American politics before the Civil War. NewYork: Oxford University Press.
Silbey, JoelH. (1991). The American political nation. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Simpson, A. W.B. (1986). A history ofthe land law, second edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Skinner, Qiientin. (1978). Foundations of modern political thought, 2 volumes. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. (1998). Liberty before liberalism. NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Skinner, Quentin. (2002). Visions of politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, Adam. (1981 [1776]). The wealth of nations. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Smith, Michael E. (2001). The Aztec empire and the Mesoamerican world system. In Susan E.Alcock, Terence N.D’Altroy, Kathleen D.Morrison, and Carla M.Sinopoli (Eds), Empires: Perspectives from archaeology and history (pp. 128–154). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Smith, MichaelE. (2003). The Aztecs, second edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Smith, MichaelE. (2004). The archaeology of ancient state economies. Annual Review of Anthropology, 33, 73-102.
Smith, MichaelE., and Montiel, Lisa. (2001). The archaeological study of empires and imperialism in pre-Hispanic Central Mexico. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology, 20 (3), 245–284.
Spiller, Pablo Т., and Tommasi, Mariano. (2007). The institutional foundations of public policy in Argentina. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spruyt, Hendrik. (1994). The sovereign state and its competitors. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Stasavage, David. (2003). Public debt and the birth of the democratic state: France and Great Britain, 1688–1789. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stasavage, David. (2006, October 21). Cites, constitutions, and sovereign borrowing in Europe, 1274–1785. Paper delivered at the Conference on Financial History, UCLA.
Steckel, Richard H., and Rose, Jerome C. (2002). The backbone of history: Health and nutrition in the western hemisphere. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Steckel, Richard H, and Wallis, John. (2006). Stones, bones, and states. Working Paper.
Stein, Ernesto and Tommasi, Pablo (Eds). (2006). The politics of policies: Economic and social progress in Latin America. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
Stenton, F.M. (1963 [1932]). The first century of English feudalism 1066–1166. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Stepan, Alfred. (2004). Toward a new comparative politics of federalism, multinational-ism, and democracy: Beyond Rikerian feder
