. , , , .
, , , . , , , .
, , , . . , , , , XVII ., (Ferejohn, 1992). . . , , (Goldstein, Keohane, 1993). . . , . , . , ; , (Bates, Weingast, 1995; Fearon, 1994; Laitin, 1988).
:
, , . , 26.
25 Bates, 1989; Bates, Weingast, 1995; Ames, 1987; Fearon, 1994; Greif, 1995; Hardin, 1995;
Levi. 1988; North, 1990; Pneworski. 1991; Root, 1994; Rosental, 1992.
26 , , , (Kahneman, Tversky, 1979).
, , , .
, (Denzau, North, 1994; Frank, 1989; Lupia, McCubbin, 1995; Noll, Krier, 1990; North, 1990). , . , , ( ), , .
|
|
, , . . , , , , , , . .
- . , , , , , , . , , , , . , ; , , . , , , , , , , .
, . , , . , , , , . , , , , , . , , , . , , , , 27.
|
|
( , , ) , , . . . , , - . , , .
27 (Green, Shapiro, 1994). , , , Critical Review 1995 .
AltJ.E., Chrystal A. Political economics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
Ames B. Political survival. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
Austen-Smith D. Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting // Public Choice. 1987. Vol. 54. P. 23-39.
Austen-Smith D., Banks J. Elections, coalitions, and legislative outcomes // American Political Science Review. 1988. Vol. 82. P. 405-422.
Austen-Smith D., Riker W.H. Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation // American Political Science Review. 1987. Vol. 81. P. 897-918.
Banks J.S. Agency budgets, cost information, and auditing //American Journal of Political
Science. 1989. Vol. 33. P. 670-699.
Banks J.S. Signalling games in political science. New York: Harwood, 1991.
Baron D. Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions // Handbook of industrial organization / Ed. by R. Schmalensee, R.D. Willig. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989. Vol. 2. P. 1347-1447.
Baron D. Service-induced campaign contributions and the electoral equilibrium // Quarterly Journal ofEconomics. 1991. Vol. 104. P. 45-72.
Baron D. Government formation and endogenous parties // American Political Science Review. 1993. Vol. 87. P. 34-47.
Baron D., Ferejohn J. Bargaining in legislatures//American Political Science Review. 1989. Vol. 83. P. 1181-1206.
Bates R.H. Beyond the miracle of the market. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Bates R.H., Weingast B.R. A new comparative politics // Working Paper. Hoover Institution. Stanford University, 1995.
Bawn K. The logic of institutional preferences: German electoral law as a social choice outcome//American Journal of Political Science. 1993. Vol. 37. P. 965-989.
Brady D., Jongryn M. Strategy and choice in the 1988 national Assembly election of Korea / Unpublished working paper. Hoover Institution. Stanford University. 1990.
Brennan G., Buchanan J.M. The power to tax. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
|
|
Buchanan J.M., Tullock G. The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1962.
Bueno de Mesquita ., Lalman D. War and reason. New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press, 1992.
Cain ., Ferejohn J., Fiorina M. The personal vote. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1981,
Calvert R.L. Models of imperfect information in politics. New York: Harwood, 1986.
Calvert R.L. The rational choice theory of social institutions: Co-operation, co-ordination, and communication // Modern Political Economy / Ed. by J. Banks, E. Hanushek. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Cogan J. The congressional budget process and the federal budget deficit // Encyclopedia of the American Legislative System / Ed. by J.H. Silbey. New York: Scribner's, 1994. P. 1333-1345.
CohenL., Noll RG. The technology porkbarrel. Washington (D.C.): Brookings Institution, 1991.
Cowhey P.P., McCubbins M.D. (eds). Political structure and public policy in Japan and the United States. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Cox G. The efficient secret. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
Cox G., McCubbins M.D. Legislative Leviathan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
Cox G., Rosenbluth F. The electoral fortunes of legislative factions in Japan //American Political Science Review. 1993. Vol. 87. P. 577-589. Critical Review. Special issue: Rational choice theory and politics. 1995. Vol. 9. WinterSpring. 1-2.
Denzau A., Mackay R. Gate keeping and monopoly power of committees // American Journal of Political Science. 1983. Vol. 27. P. 740-762.
Denzau A., North D. C. Shared mental models: Ideologies and institutions // Kyklos. 1994. Vol. 47. P. 3-31.
Elster 7. The cement of society. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
Endow J.M., Hinich M.J. The spatial theory of voting. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1984.
Epstein D., O'Halloran S. Administrative procedures, information, and agency discretion //American Journal of Political Science. 1994. Vol. 38. P. 697-722.
Eskridge W.N. (jr.). Reneging on history? Playing the Court/Congress/President civil rights game//California Law Review. 1991. Vol. 79. P. 613-684.
Eskridge W.N. (jr.), Ferejohn J. The article I, Section 7 game // Georgetown Law Journal. 1992. Vol. 80. P. 523-564.
Fearon J. Ethnic warfare as acommitment problem / Unpublished manuscript. University of Chicago, 1994.
Ferejohn J. Changes in welfare policy in the 1980s // Politics and economics in the eighties / Ed. by A. Alesina, G.Carliner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989. P. 123-142.
Ferejohn J. Rationality and interpretation: Parliamentary elections in early Stuart England // The economic approach to politics / Ed. by K. Monroe. New York: HarperCollins, 1992. P. 279-305.
Ferejohn J., Shipan C. Congressional influence on telecommunications // Congress
reconsidered / Ed. by L. Dodd, B. Oppenheimer. Washington: CQ Press, 1989. P. 393-410.
Fiorina M.P. Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment. New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press, 1989; originally published 1977.
Fiorina M.P. Congressional control of the bureaucracy // Congress reconsidered / Ed. by L. Dodd, B. Oppenheimer. Washington: CQ Press, 1981. P. 332-348.
Frank R. If homo-economicus could choose his own utility function, would he want one
with a conscience? //American Economic Review. 1989. Vol. 79. P. 594-606.
Gely R., Spiller P. T. The political economy of Supreme Court constitutional decisions: The case of Roosevelt's Court packing plan // International Review of Law and Economics. 1992. Vol. 12. P. 45-67.
|
|
Gerber E. Legislative response to threats of popular initiatives // American Journal of
Political Science. 1996. Vol. 40.
Gilligan T. W., Krehbiel K. Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature // American Journal of Political Science. 1990. Vol. 34. P. 531-564.
Goldstem J., Keohane R. 0. Ideas and foreign policy. Ithaca (N.Y.): Comell University Press, 1993.
Green D., Shapiro I. Pathologies of rational choice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.
GreifA. The institutional foundations of Genoa's economic growth: Self-enforcing political
relations, organizational innovations, and economic growth during the commercial revolution / Mimeo. Department of Economics. Stanford University, 1995.
Greif A., Milgrom P., Weingast B.R. Commitment, coordination, and enforcement: The
case of the merchant guilds // Journal of Political Economy. 1994. Vol. 102. P. 745-776.
GrierK.B. Congressional influence on U.S. monetary policy: An empirical test // Journal of Monetary Economics. 1991. Vol. 28. P. 201-220.
Hall P., Taylor R. Political science and the four new institutionalisms // Political Studies.
1996. Forthcoming.
Hardin R. Why a constitution? // The federalist papers and the new institutionalism / Ed. by B. Grofman, D.Wittman. New York: Agathon Press, 1989. P. 100-120.
Hardin R. One for all: The logic of group conflict. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University
Press, 1995.
Hartz L. The liberal tradition in American. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1955.
Kahneman D., Tversky A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk // Econometrica. 1979. Vol. 47. P. 163-191.
Keohane P.O., Martin L. Delegation to international organizations. Paper given at the
conference Where is the New Institutionalism Now? University of Maryland. College
Park, 1994. Oct. 15.
KiewietD.R., McCubbins M.D. The logic of delegation. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991.
KousserJ.M. The shaping of southern politics. New Haven (Conn.): Yale University Press, 1974.
Krehbiel K. Information and legislative organization. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1991.
Lailin D. Language games // Comparative Politics. 1988. Vol. 20. P. 389-402.
Laver M., Schofield N. Multi party Govemment.New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Lover M., Shepsle K.A. Mailing and breaking governments. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Levi M. Of rule and revenue. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Lohmann S. Federalism and central bank autonomy: The politics of German monetary
policy, 1960-1989 / Mimeo. Department of Political Science. UCLA, 1994.
Lupia A., McCubbins M.D. Knowledge, power, and democracy / Mimeo. Universityof
California. San Diego, 1995.
Matthews S. Veto threats: Rhetoric in bargaining // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1989. Vol. 104. P. 347-369.
McCarty N.M., Poole K.T. Veto power and legislation: An empirical analysis of executive and legislative bargaining from 1961 to 1986 // Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization. 1995. Vol. 11. P. 282-312.
McCubbins M.D. Party governance and U.S. budget deficits: Divided government and fiscal stalemate // Politics and economics in the eighties / Ed. by A. Alesina, G. Carliner.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989.P. 83-111.
McCubbins M.D., SchwartT. T. Oversight overlooked: Police patrols vs. fire alarms//American Journal of Political Science. 1984. Vol. 28. P. 165-179.
McCubbins M.D., Noll R.G., Weingast B.R. Administrative procedures as instruments of political control // Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 1987. Vol. 3. P. 243-277.
McCubbins M.D., Noll R.G., Weingast B.R. Structure and process, politics and policy:
Administrative arrangements and the political control of agencies // Virginia Law
Review. 1989. Vol. 75. P. 431-482.
McKelvey R. Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implicationsfor
agenda control //Journal of Economic Theory. 1976. Vol. 12. P. 472-482.
Milgrom P., Roberts J. Economics, organizations, and management. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1991.
Miller G.J., Hammond .. Stability and efficiency in a separation-of-powers constitutional system // The federalist papers and the newinstitutionalism / Ed. by B.Grofman,
D. Wittman. New York: Agathon Press, 1989.
Voe T.M. The politicized presidency // The new direction in American politics / Ed. by J.E. Chubb, P.E. Peterson. Washington (D.C.): Brookings Institution, 1985a. P. 235-271.
V T.M. Control and feedback in economic regulation: The case of the NLRB // AmericannPolitical Science Review. 1985A. Vol. 79. P. 1094-1116.
'/oe T.M. An assessment of the positive theory of congressional dominance // Legislative
|
|
Studies Quarterly. 1987a. Vol. 12. P. 475-520.
T.M. Interests, institutions, and positive theory: The politics of the NLRB // Studies
in American Political Development. 19876. Vol. 2. P. 236-299,
^foe T. M. The political structure of agencies // Can the government govern? / Ed. by J. E. Chubb, P.E. Peterson. Washington (D.C.): Brookings Institution, 1989. P. 267-329.
hntinola G., Qian Y., Weingast B.R. Federalism, Chinese style: The political basis for economic reform in China // World Politics. 1995. Vol. 48. P. 50-81.
--// R. G. The political foundations of regulatory policy // Congress: Structure and policy /Ed.by M.D. McCubbins, T. Sullivan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. P. 462-492.
-// R. G. Economic perspectives on the politics of regulation // Handbook of industrial organization / Ed. by R. Schmalensee,R.D. Willig. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989. Vol 2. P. 1253-1287.
-^7 R. G., Krier J. Some implications of cognitive psychology for risk regulation // Journal of Legal Studies. 1990. Vol. 29. P. 747-779.
:"7h D.C. Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance. New York;
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
-h D.C., Thomas R. The Rise of the Western world. New York: Norton, 1973.
:4ih D.C., Weingast B.R. Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions eoverning public choice in 17th century England // Journal of Economic History. 1989. Vol. 49. P. 803-832.
Halloran S. Politics, process, and American trade policy. Ann Arbor: UniversityofMichigan Press, 1994.
"xshook P. C. Constitutional stability// Constitutional Political Economy. 1993. Vol. 3. P. 137-175.
"en G., Grofman B. Optimal partisan gerrymandering // Political Geography Quarterly. 1988. Vol. 7. P. 5-22.
Persson ., Tabellini G. Macroeconomic policy, credibility, and politics. London: Harwood, 1990.
Polsby N. W. Congress and the presidency. Englewood Cliffs (N.J.): Prentice-Hall, 1986.
Poole K., Rosenthal H. Congress: A quantitative history of roll call voting: 1789-1989. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Przeworski A. Democracy and the market. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
RamseyerJ.M., Rosenbluth F.M. The politics of oligarchy: Institutional choice in Imperial
Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Riker W.H. Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for the study of institutions //American Political Science Review. 1980. Vol. 74. P. 432-446.
Riker W.H. Liberalism against populism. San Francisco: W,H. Freeman, 1982.
Roback J. An imaginary Negro in an impossible place: The territories and secession.
Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1982. Forthcoming.
Rodriguez D. The positive political dimensions of regulatory reform // Washington University Law Quarterly. 1994. Vol. 72. P. 1-150.
Rogowski R. Commerce and coalitions. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1989.
Romer ., Rosenthal H. Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status
quo // Public Choice. 1978. Vol. 33. P. 27-43.
Romer ., Rosenthal H. Modem political economy and the study of regulation // Public
regulation: New perspectives on institutions and politics / Ed. by E.E. Bailey. Cambridge
(Mass.): MIT Press, 1985. P. 73-116.
Root H.L. The fountain of privilege: Political foundations of market in old regime France
and England. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
Rosenthal H. The setter model // Advances in the spatial theory of voting / Ed. by J.M. Enelow, M.J. Hinich. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Rosenthal J.-L. The fruits of revolution: Property rights, litigation, and French agriculture,
1700-1860. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Rothenberg L.S. Regulation, organizations, and politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.
Shepsle K.A. Institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institutions // Political science:
The science of politics / Ed. by H.Weisberg. New York: Agathon, 1986. P. 51-81.
Shepsle K.A. Discretion, institutions, and the problem of government commitment //
Social theory for a changing society / Ed. by P. Bourdieu, J. Coleman. Boulder (Colo.):
Westview, 1991. P. 245-263.
Shepsle K.A., Weingast B.R. The institutional foundations of committee power // American Political Science Review. 1987. Vol. 81. P. 85-194.
Silbey J.H. The partisan imperative: The dynamics of American politics before theCivil
War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Skocpol T. States and social revolutions. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.
SnyderJ. On buying legislatures // Economics and Politics. 1991. Vol. 3. P. 93-109.
Snyder S.K., Weingast B.R. The American system of shared powers: The president, Congress, and the NLRB // Working Paper. Hoover Institution. Stanford University, 1994
Strom K. Minority government and majority rule. New York: Cambridge University Press 1990.
Tsebelis G. Nested games. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
Weingast B.R. Institutions and political commitment: A new political economy of the
American Civil War era / Mimco. Stanford University, 1995a.
Weingast B.R. The economic role of political institutions: Federalism, markets, and economic development//Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 19956. Vol. 11. P. 1-31.
Weingast B.R., Moron M. Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? // Journal of
Political Economy. 1983. Vol. 91. P. 765-800.
Williamson O.E. The economic institutions of capitalism. New York: Free Press, 1985.
Williamson O.E. The institutions and governance of economic development and reform //
Working Paper. University of California. Berkeley, 1994.
6