The price of high-speed implementation higher in Japan, along with all the debt falling on the state-owned JNR led to a large financial burden and privatization.
Leading up to 1987, the JNR compiled approximately $200 billion US Dollars, resulting in the necessity for privatization (Albalate and Bel, 2010). Since the privatization, the high-speed rail system has been managed by JNR and six regional private enterprises: JR East, JR Central, JR West, JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, JR Kyushu, and JR Freight (Kagyama, 2000). This transition has allowed for JNR to lesson the burden of the high implementation cost of HSR in the high land priced country. Since the privatization, a mixed funding approach has been adapted, leading to a much more economically successful HSR system. For example, the Kyushu Shinkansen, which was opened in 2004, was constructed by government and public funds; 50% of the construction cost was supplied by Shinkansen deliverance transfer revenues; and 50% was funded by central and local government (Lee, 2007). With HSR implementation presenting such a large up-front cost, the most cost-effective solution is to offset some costs by developing a mixture of private and public funding.
When comparing the Japanese funding approach to HSR implementation to the United States funding plan, it is clear to see why the US supports a mixed funding approach. The upfront cost for HSR implementation was too much for the Japanese government to take on alone; mixed funding proved to be much more successful. The sheer geographic size of the United States compared to Japan provides merit to why total governmental public funding would not be feasible. Overall, Japan was forced to learn the hard way that HSR implementation requires a mixed funding approach; the United States has the opportunity to learn from Japans mistakes and adopt mixed funding from the start.
Question Three: Did this case have a regional implementation scheme?
The Shinkansen HSR system differed from the French TGV implementation scheme in that the regional implementation strategy was not as strictly followed. JNR was much looser about their political commitments to regional implementation. As stated above, one of the initial economic downfalls that led to privatization was the planned implementation in lower populated areas that resulted in lower ridership percentages; this planning in turn led to further debt falling upon the JNR. Following the 1964 (Tokaido Shinkansen) implementation, new Shinkansen lines were opened in 1975 (Sanyo Shinkansen), two in 1982 (Tohoku Shinkansen (Omiya-Morioka branch and Joetsu Shikansen), 1985 (Tohoku Shinkansen- Ueno-Omiya Branch), 1991 (Tohoku Shinkansen- Tokyo-Ueno Branch), 1997 (Hokuriku Shinkansen), 2002 (Tohoku Shinkansen-Morioka-Hachinohe), and the Kyushu Shinkansen branch in 2004 (Shinkansen, 2007). Table 19 gives a more detailed image of all the Shinkansen lines.
Table 19: Shinkansen (2007)
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Despite the debt problems leading to privatization, the incremental implementation has ultimately led to an economic and social successful high-speed system.
When comparing this implementation strategy with the United States plan, there are two lessons that can be taken from Japan. First, the initial success of the 1964 Shinkansen line led to an over-excitement from political forces, resulting in financial commitments to development in geographic areas that were not ready for HSR. It is important for the United States to remember that HSR is only needed in highly populated areas at the regional level (100-600 miles). Second, and on a more positive note as a result of privatization, the regional impacts of HSR in highly populated areas have been positive on multiple fronts. Ultimately, the implementation strategy in Japan was one that was not properly planned, neglecting important regional demographic characteristics.
Mixed funding after 1987 led to a more comprehensive and precise implementation strategy; if this funding approach was used from the beginning, each regional enterprise could have decided on more specific guidelines for their given region.
Question Four: Did this case support other transportation sectors?
Despite the original skeptics of Japanese citizens about the HSR travel compared to other forms of transportation (Kagiyama, 2000), the implementation of the Shinkansen between Tokyo and Osaka immediately impacted the other transportation sectors. The first advantage that Shinkansen had over air travel was the fact that the commercial air sector was far from fully developed in Japan. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) explain that because of this advantage, Shinkansen has dominated the market share of regional travel despite a rise in air travel over time (Table 20).
Table 20: Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010)
Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) also explain that Japans Shinkansen high-speed rail line draws more than three times as many passengers per year as air travel. For trips under 500 miles, Shinkansen holds a dominant share of the market (Table 21).
Table 21: Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010)
On more recent terms for Yamagata Shinkansen (1992), the total traffic volume increased by 15%; however, aircraft passenger, dropped sharply to 10% in the case of modal share, whereas HSR increased to 89% (Lee, 2007) (Table 22).
Table 22: Lee (2007)
Overall, Shinkansen has dominated the transportation sector in Japan at the regional level (less than 500 miles).
Despite the market share dominance at the regional level, Japan has worked hard in continual support and development for the auto sector in order to improve the overall surface transportation system. Japan has been spending massive amounts of money to further develop the auto sector. In 1987, the Seto Ohashi Bridge was completed for road travel, costing about 7.7 billion US dollars. In 1998, the Akashi Kaikyo Bridge opened to
the public after ten years of construction and 500 billion yen or 4.6 billion U.S. dollars. Also in 1998, the Ministry of Transport approved construction for three new Shinkansen lines with a budget of one trillion yen or 9.2 billion U.S. dollars (Kagiyama, 2000). Kagiyama (2000) illustrates that Japan is not only developing HSR; they are also spending large amounts of money for auto sector development.
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Comparing Japan to the United States, there are some clear lessons that should be learned. First, it is important to understand the differences in demographics between the United States and Japan. Okada (1994) explains that the population density (per square km of habitable land) is 1500 in Japan compared to a mere 50 in the US. Also, the populations of Japan are much more concentrated in urban centers, while US populations have been experiencing more urban sprawl over time. A further decentralized population calls for further investment in the auto sector. However, the market share that Shinkansen has at the regional travel level should not only be admired, but also strived for. The economic and environmental advantages that HSR has over air travel at the regional level (100-600 miles) are undeniable (Table 23: Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010)); clearly, Japan can be a model for the United States in this aspect.
Table 23: Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010)
In sum, Japan HSR has dominated the market share over air travel since its opening in 1964; however, the auto sector has recently (1990s) experienced a boost in economic support, working toward a further developed surface transportation system.
Question Five: Did this case develop transit-oriented development?
As stated in the French case, a high-speed system is only truly successful when it is fully developed and connected to local transportation sectors, allowing for a full range of travelers to access the train. Okada (1994) explains that in general, because the Japanese railways were developed before or during the large expansion of the industrial centers, and also because rail transport was the only means of reliable transportation
during development, urban cities were built around stations that have been transformed into Shinkansen stations. This has allowed for an easy transition into a successful transit-oriented development program, connecting local transit such has suburban railway, subway, bus, and taxi services.
Japanese urban centers have been connected with the ever-advancing Shinkansen system, creating a fully extensive and connected transportation system. Kagiyama (2000) supports this claim by stating:
In Osaka and Tokyo, subways, express trains, monorail, and Automatic Guideway Transit (AGT) are some of the transportation alternatives available throughout each city. In Tokyo, there is an extensive underground network of subways totaling 148 miles,
which carry 7.3 million passengers per day with a headway of two minutes during the peak periods. The success of transporting people between major metropolitan areas could not occur without the metropolitan regional governments plan for an expansive and
reliable transportation network to disperse incoming and outgoing traffic.
These are specific examples of how regional transportation, supported by government and private enterprises, are able to interconnect, developing into a successful transit-oriented system.
It would be difficult for the US to duplicate the transit-oriented development that Japan has accomplished simply because the US city centers are fully developed without centralized train stations. However, the lesson that Japan provides is one of connectivity upon multiple fronts. The more avenues that US systems can create for different travelers to access the train, the better off the transportation system (air, auto, and rail) will be as a whole. Japan has proven that connectivity to HSR is the key to smooth, reliable, energy efficient, and safe travel.
Question Six: Did this case develop a mixed rail infrastructure?
From the beginning of implementation, Japan has not used a mixed rail infrastructure for the Shinkansen. Similar to France, high speed specific, new-implemented lines were a necessity between the major city centers. However, there wasnt a need for the Shinkansen to have the capability to run on conventional lines like the TGV. First, the population density of Japan is extremely high and centered around the major cities. Second, the transit-oriented development was so well developed in the inner cities that there wasnt any need for Shinkansen to run on conventional lines. Again, this is due to the fact that the rail stations were placed in the city centers. Albalate and Bel (2010) also explain that the separation of high-speed lines from conventional rail service allowed Shinkansen to avoid problems from the conventional services and its ageing infrastructure, increasing its overall reliability.
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Okada (1994) explains other aspects that relate to the need for the implementation of new infrastructure rather than mixed. First, in order to create the most direct path between city centers, many tunnels were required, creating the need for new track to be laid. Second, frequent earthquakes, heavy rains, and unstable ground on the plains are safety risks. Using conventional, aging lines at higher speeds is a safety hazard that cannot be taken for granted. Third, with Japans high environmental regulations in terms of emission and noise pollution standards, new upgraded infrastructure became the most cost-effective route. All these reasons stated above relate to the high initial cost of the Shinkansen lines; however, it has proven to be a cost-effective, long-term solution to the unique demographic national layout.
Comparing the Japanese rail infrastructure to the United States should be taken lightly. The demographic layout does not require for Japan to develop HSR that can run on conventional lines; however, there is merit for the US to consider that development due to urban sprawl, a much smaller population density, and less-developed transit-oriented local connectivity. The United States should however, look into the infrastructure safety technology that Japan has implemented due to the immaculate record of success in that realm. Overall, Japan has developed a cost-effective infrastructure system that is molded specifically for the national demographic layout. The United States can learn lessons in terms of safety technology and the need for demographic-specific infrastructure design.
Summary
First implemented in 1964, the Japanese Shinkansen high-speed line is considered successful despite some financial setbacks for a number of reasons. First, the Shinkansen has successfully dominated market-share for the targeted regional travel throughout the county. Second, the Shinkansen has been the most reliable source of transportation and has continually cut travel time for millions of passengers between major city centers. Third, the Shinkansen has been economically profitable over time despite the large debt JNR acquired before the privatization. Fourth, there has not been one human death due to an accident since the first train left the station in 1964. Fifth, the ever-increasing energy efficiency of the Shinkansen continually increases Japans energy independence. And last, the transit-oriented development built around the Shinkansen city-centered stations has opened up access to travelers of all sorts. The Shinkansen is a high-speed system that
can provide numerous lessons for the US on efficiency, safety, reliability, local connectivity, and demographic specific design.
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Germany: ICE
Background
The German Intercity Express (ICE) arrived in 1991, a decade after the French TGV. The largest considerable difference between the ICE with the French TGV and Japans Shinkansen is that freight was placed as a much higher priority in Germany.
Gleave (2004) explains that the Germanys national railroads are owned and operated by Deutsch Bahn AG (DB), a private joint stock company, which is responsible for both passenger and freight trains and is also responsible for maintaining the infrastructure. It is divided into a number of different divisions, of which DB Reise & Touristik is responsible for all long distance passenger services, including high-speed services, and DB Netz in responsible for all infrastructure.
In 1991, the Hanover-Wurzburg and Mannheim-Stuttgart lines were opened, totaling 427 km in length. Other lines that have been implemented include: Hannover-Berlin in 1998; Köln-Frankfurt in 2002/04, Germanys first 300kph line; and Hamburg-Berlin in 2004 (Gourvish, 2012). There are also connections with the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, and Austria; adding to the interconnectedness of rail throughout the European Union. Table 24 provides a detailed layout of the German ICE lines and their connectivity with other nations (Eurail, 2012).
Table 24: Eurail (2012)
The economic and social impacts of the ICE will be discussed in further detail below; however, there is a sense of lack of success in Germany compared to France and Japan due to the following reasons: expensiveness of implementation, policitcal and legal obstacles within the government, and low population density in German cities.
Question One: Was the implementation deemed a success?
When examining the success of the German ICE, there is merit to consider a different viewpoint. Albalate and Bel (2010) state that overall goals of the German HSR implementation were different than France and Japan:
The main consideration when designing the new lines was not faster passenger traffic, but rather the highly profitable overnight traffic between the North Sea ports and the
industrial areas and consumer markets in Southern Germany. Goods transport was deemed more important, because it contributes considerably more to the turnover than is the case of passenger traffic. A further difference with the TGV in France is that the
HSTs in Germany are heavier, wider and more expensive to run, but offer greater flexibility
With more emphasis placed on freight transfer, it is therefore necessary to judge the German implementation based upon their goals. However, even when taking upon a freight-based viewpoint, there are still some characteristics of the implementation of the ICE that have been deemed unsuccessful on the whole.
The first aspect that has led to the high cost of implementation was the choice of infrastructure combined with the nations geographic terrain. A highly mountainous terrain and the requirement to build sections to provide easier gradients so that freight could also use the new infrastructure, made construction costs comparatively high (Gourvish, 2012). Gourvish goes on to state in further detail of the high costs compared to the TGV and the Shinkansen:
Construction costs were inevitably higher than with the French TGV as much as three times higher per kilometer. At the same time the more limited impact of the ICE, in
comparison with that of the TGV and Shinkansen, means that the pay-off in terms of traffic generation has not been as great as in Japan and France
The mixed infrastructure implementation combined with the mountainous terrain led to high implementation costs. The second aspect leading to high construction costs were the various legal and political obstacles, delaying the ICE implementation for a decade. Before new lines can be formed, German law requires public disclosure and public hearings. The ICE generated 360 lawsuits and 10,700 objections (Najafi and Nassar, 1996). This led to inevitable delays in implementation and eventual higher costs.
The other aspect that has led to ICE unsuccessfulness compared to the TGV and Shinkansen is ridership percentages, directly attributed to the low population density of the German cities. Greave (2004) illustrates how the population distribution affects the productivity of the ICE:
Germanys population is widely dispersed: only three cities have a population of more than 1 million (Berlin, Hamburg and Munich) and only one of these (Berlin) has a population of more than 2 million. As a result, long distance trains need to make multiple
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stops to serve the potential market and this tends to increase journey times; for example, the high-speed train between Munich and Hamburg makes a minimum of seven
intermediate stops.
The population density of Germany is much lower compared to France and Japan, which has led to lower ridership percentages and low economic profitability as a result of HSR development. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) explain this slow growth by stating:
The economic growth associated with high-speed rail came before the line entered into service, as businesses and individuals changed their economic behavior in anticipation of
the arrival of high-speed rail. Based on their results, the researchers project that every 1 percent increase in market access delivered by high-speed rail will result in a 0.27 percent increase in economic activity in a region.
The low percentages of annual economic growth, along with low population densities throughout the German cities has led to lower ridership percentages compared to France and Japan. Overall, the successfulness of the ICE HSR system is largely dependent on strict characteristics; the high cost infrastructure, a high amount of legal obstacles, and the low population density, leading to the ICE being deemed relatively unsuccessful compared to France and Japan.
Question Two: Did this case support the USHSR funding approach?
The ICE has been funded over the years, by a mixture of the private DB and the German government. This funding approach is similar to the TGV; however, it is again the political obstacles that have provided for a difficult funding approach. This section will examine the in-depth policy implementation process that is required for HSR implementation in Germany.
Gleave (2004) explains that the HSR and infrastructure programs are addressed in the Bundesverkehrswegeplan (BVWP), a transportation plan developed by the regional
governments, local governments, and the DB. This plan alone can take up to ten years to complete. Once the BVWP is completed, it is presented to the national government and must be passed by both houses of parliament in order for federal funding and implementation to begin. In each plan, a risk assessment, environmental assessment, and a cost-benefit analysis must take place. Once the plan is passed by parliament, it is passed on to the EBA (Eisenbahnbundesamt, the federal railway office, which also functions as the rail regulator), which fields all objections and lawsuits and decides whether the financial agreement with the government and DB is feasible. If the BVWP passes the review of the EBA and all lawsuits are settled, the implementation of the lines can take place.
When comparing this funding approach to the U.S. process, there are some similarities in the selection processes. Like Germany, U.S. regions need to produce their own plan, including risk assessments, implementation plans, environmental assessments, and a cost-benefit analysis, before any construction can begin. The difference between the two countries lies in what branch of government the plans are being presented to. The U.S. plans state that regional implementation strategies will be presented to the Department of Transportation, which will decide if the strategy is feasible. This process will generally run more smoothly than the German process since the BVWP needs to be approved by both houses of parliament and the EBA. Also, the DOT has developed guidelines for each region to follow when compiling an implementation strategy. Some of these criteria include the need for a high population and the implementation at the 100-600 mile range; low population areas and plans outside this mile range will not be
considered. Therefore, although there are some characteristics similar to the German process, the U.S. plan, in theory, will develop faster and more efficiently.
Question Three: Did this case have a regional implementation scheme?
The main goal for the German ICE implementation strategy was to improve on existing lines to make suitable for high-speed travel, while still allowing for freight travel; this was a clear strategy in avoidance of bottlenecking. As stated in the background section, the ICE was implemented on an incremental level, piecing together different parts to make the system as a whole accessible to both rail services. Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010) elaborate on this concept in further detail by stating:
Incremental improvements were an important part of the build -out of high-speed rail in densely populated Germany, where freight trains have always shared track with high-speed and conventional passenger rail out of economic necessity. Germany moved
toward high -speed rail through a combination of track improvements that enabled travel at up to 125 miles per hour and the construction of new segments of line to bypass bottlenecks. Germany also built its system piecemeal over time, pursuing a long-term
series of improvements that have resulted in continual improvements in service.
Besides the high implementation costs, this type of implementation can be successful in terms of vulnerability. With two separate rail sectors traveling on the same lines, the lines themselves are much less vulnerable to economic collapse. If the ICE system collapses, the lines can still be used to freight travel, and vise-versa. This type differs from France in that the TGV lines were not constructed in low populated areas or terrain that would be difficult to construct high-speed lines; instead, the TGV developed a train that has the ability to travel on high-speed tracks and conventional tracks. For Japan, they seem to be more vulnerable to collapse because of their high-speed specific lines; however, with the
extremely high population density and ever growing overall population, a collapse is very unlikely.
When comparing the German implementation plan to the United States, there are some clear differences. In the U.S., it is up to each region, based on the specific demographics, to decide what type of infrastructure to implement. However, there is a set standard for both distance (100-600 miles) and population density requirements. At first, each region of the United States should be treated as its own separate system. The focus should be to connect only the highly populated cities with as few stops as possible, continually reducing travel time and increasing reliability. The German system was not implemented in this way; much more emphasis was placed on avoiding bottlenecking, making the system accessible for both passenger and freight travel. This has resulted in a less-vulnerable system in terms of the rail lines always being used, yet has also resulted in lower economic success compared to France and Japan because of lines being placed in low populated areas.
Question Four: Did this case support other transportation sectors?
Germanys ICE has had a mixture of success when competing with the air and auto sectors. In cities with high-speed stations, ICE has generally been successful in displacing air travel. For example, between Cologne and Frankfurt, since the arrival of high-speed rail, rail has come to account for 97 percent of the air-rail market share Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010). However, Gleave, (2004)) explains that the decreasing of flight pricing in Germany has been affecting ICE market share:
In part as a result of long journey times, rail is facing growing competition from low cost airlines in Germany and the rail regulator (EBA) has suggested that it will be difficult for rail to compete over long distances with the airlines. Rail fares have usually been charged
on a per kilometer basis in Germany, which means that rail has become particularly uncompetitive for long distance journeys. Rail also faces strong competition from the
road network: motorways have neither tolls nor speed limits.
The long journey times for the ICE are not necessarily from a lack of speed capability, but rather a necessity for more stops and higher rail traffic. The ICE needs to stop more than the TGV and Shinkansen because of the low population density; and there is more traffic on the ICE due to the freight sector also using the lines.
Although the ICE may become less attractive for German citizens on long distance travel, it is still in support of the air sector in Germany. Similar to France, high-speed stations can be found at various German airports, connecting travel at the intermediate distance to long-distance travel. For example, the ICE rail station at the airport in Cologne, Germany (above), provides direct access to the high-speed rail network connecting Germany and other nations in northern Europe (Table 25) (Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva, 2010).
Table 25: Dutzik, Schneider, Baxandall, and Steva (2010)
In terms of auto travel, strong competition exists between the two sectors; however, there is not much support from the ICE for the auto sector. The main source that drives the competition between HSR and auto in Germany is the fact that there are no tolls or speed limits on the German high way system (Gleave, 2004). This allows passengers to travel as fast as they want without paying tolls in the comfort of their individual vehicles. When it comes to buses however, DB has a monopoly control over the long distance buses and designs them to not compete with the ICE (Gleave, 2004).
Comparing this to the United States, if HSR is to be successful in the US, a greater effort needs to be made compared to Germany in supporting connectivity of both the air and auto sector. Also, HSR prices in the US need to be competitive with regional travel in order to develop and maintain high ridership. The US plan is to displace air and auto travel at the 100 to 600 mile range, Germany is a clear lesson on how connectivity can be improved to provide economic incentives for HSR.
Question Five: Did this case develop transit-oriented development?
Due to lower population densities in German cities, the transit-oriented development in terms of connecting major metropolitan centers to the ICE is lacking overall. However, in Berlin, the Savignyplatz Railway Station is fully connected not only to local transit, but also the local economy, making multiple facets of the city accessible to all ICE passengers (CHSRA, 2010). One of the main aspects of the Berlin station is the various commercial activities that are located under the track, leading to a greener, more connected community. Although transit-oriented development is lacking around many ICE stations, Berlin could be used as a sample city to base other development around.
In the United States plan, transit-oriented development is a major aspect that needs to be developed to the fullest in order to maximize the HSR benefits. If the HSR stations are not connected in some way or another to each urban center, the trains will be less attractive on the whole. Transit-oriented development increases convenience for the passengers to be able to connect to other forms of transportation; this increases the overall ridership of the line and also increases the economic profitability for the community and region. The lack of ridership and economic prosperity of the ICE compared to Japan and France provides a clear lesson to the U.S. on the importance of HSR based transit-oriented development.
Question Six: Did this case develop a mixed rail infrastructure?
As stated above, Germany has developed a mixed rail infrastructure, using the same lines for both the ICE and freight transport. As a result, the implementation of this specific infrastructure has proven more costly compared to other countries. Vickerman (1996) examines the reasons behind the high cost:
The German new lines have been much more expensive than the French lines. Due to more difficult terrain (they are replacing difficult old lines through mountainous terrain),
they have required a high proportion of line in tunnel. Secondly they have been designed for multi-purpose use, by the very high speed ICE trains at 250 km/h, by traditional IC trains running at 200 km/h and by freight trains running at lower speeds, but requiring
more expensive engineering.
Another result of this mixed rail infrastructure is longer trip times due to more frequent stops and higher rail traffic (Gourvish, 2012). The frequent stops are attributed to a lower population density throughout the country, requiring the need for more stations in intermediate centers in between the larger urban centers. The higher rail traffic is attributed to the infrastructure design itself; with freight transport sharing the lines, there
are more trains in commute. This also raises costs due to the need for enhanced communication and safety standards.
Although the costs of the implementation were high, the rail implementation has been able to achieve one of the goals of the original plan: avoidance of bottlenecking and flexibility. With the mixed infrastructure, bottlenecking is avoided due to the use of both freight and ICE. The design of the train itself has increased the flexibility due to the weight and width. The mountainous terrain and the freight service require wider, heavier trains that are more costly to run; however, they are more flexible because they are able to travel through the mountains on the most direct route, and can also break-off onto conventional lines.
For the United States, there are two clear lessons that should be taken from examining the German ICE infrastructure. First, HSR is only necessary and economically profitable with lines running between high densely populated urban centers. Frequent stops in lower populated centers reduce speed and increases travel time. Second, and in correlation with the first lesson, HSR should be implemented using their own designated lines in between the major urban centers. This will ensure low rail traffic resulting greater speed, reliability, and safety. The German ICE was successful in avoiding bottlenecking and inflexibility, yet was not successful in implementing the infrastructure at a relatively reasonable cost.
Summary
The German ICE was opened in 1991, a decade after the TGV, despite having planning commence around the same time. There are multiple aspects of this system that
are deemed less efficient and less successful compared to France and Japan. Mixed rail infrastructure has led to higher costs and more rail congestion. The low population density of the German cities has resulted in frequent stops and increasing trip times. The political and legal structure of the German system allowed for numerous delays in the planning phase of the ICE. Finally, the lack of transit-oriented development in many of the cities with stations has cost economic opportunities to go unnoticed. The United States has the opportunity to take many lessons from the German ICE in infrastructure, political development of rail lines, and transit-oriented development.
Discussion
The case studies of France, Japan, and Germany have each individually provided lessons on the implementation of high-speed rail, policy implementation, demographics, and more; however, focusing on the case studies at the individual level does not provide the optimum setting for analysis. This section will consist of a cross-case analysis, a triangulation of the three cases to better understand the important lessons that are applicable to the United States. The structure of this section will remain consistent with the structure of the case studies; examining the similarities and differences from each of the six questions. The three HSR systems studied provide empirical insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the US Department of Transportation HSR plan.
Question One: Was each implementation deemed a success?
Both the France and Japan HSR systems have been deemed an overall success; Germany, comparatively, has not been deemed successful for a number of reasons. The French TGV has able to implement the high-speed lines in a relatively inexpensive form; both Japan and Germany have spent much more on the initial implementation of their infrastructure. However, because of the high ridership from large population densities, Japan was able to overcome the large initial investment much easier than Germany.
Ridership is one of the most important factors to the successfulness of a HSR system in any given country. France and Japan were both able to develop high initial ridership that has continually grown over the years due to a combination of high population density in urban centers, reliability, and few stops. Germany, has struggled with ridership numbers for the very same reasons: the population density in the major
urban centers is lower, leading to the need for more stops along the high-speed lines, resulting in longer travel times and decreased reliability.
Safety is another imperative characteristic that must be near flawless in order to be considered successful. From the beginning of their existence, neither the TGV nor the Shinkansen have ever had a single passenger death due to a HSR accident; Germany cannot lay claim on such a statistic. The 1998 ICE crash of the Eschede train resulted in 101 deaths and 80 injuries of a total 287 passengers. Safety is an extremely vulnerable attribute that directly affects the overall economic output of the high-speed line. One accident, such as the 1998 ICE crash, will immediately result in lower ridership percentages and a loss in economic output.
Overall, cost of implementation, ridership numbers, and safety are the three main attributes that have separated France and Japan from Germany. There are many more attributes that will be discussed below; however, these larger concepts will be underlying each and every following concept, providing a continually clearer picture as to why each system was successful or not.
| Success Variables | France | Japan | Germany |
| No, Until | Yes, Long Legal | ||
| Mixed Funding? | Yes | Privatization | Obstacles |
| Regional Implementation Strategy? | Yes | No | No |
| Incramental Strategy? | Yes | No | No |
| Strong Safety Record? | Yes | Yes | No |
| Air and Auto Support? | Yes | Yes | No |
| Strong Transit Oriented Development? | Yes | Yes | No |
| Designated High-Speed Lines? | Yes | Yes | No |
