Tablighi Jamaat: Apolitical Fundamentalism?

 

Unlike the Salafis or the followers of the Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Nurcu movements, the activity of Tablighi Jamaat in the Volga region has been considerably less visible. This religious movement dates back to 1927. Founded by Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandhlawi (1885–1944), Tablighi Jamaat emerged in British-controlled India. Expanding into Russia’s Volga region has not been a priority of Tablighi Jamaat, despite gradual growth being typical for the movement since its inception. Ac-cording to Alex Alexiev,

 

Despite its size, worldwide presence, and tremendous importance, Tablighi Jamaat remains largely unknown outside the Muslim community, even to many scholars of Islam. This is no coincidence. Tablighi Jamaat o_cials work to remain outside of both media and gov-ernmental notice. Tablighi Jamaat neither has a formal organizational structure nor does it publish details about the scope of its activities, its membership, or its finances. By eschew-ing open discussion of politics and portraying itself only as a pietistic movement, Tablighi Jamaat works to project a nonthreatening image. Because of the movement’s secrecy, schol-ars often have no choice but to rely on explanations from Tablighi Jamaat acolytes. As a result, academics tend to describe the group as an apolitical devotional movement stressing individual faith, introspection, and spiritual development.95

 

Indeed, historian Barbara Metcalf defines it as “a quietist, apolitical movement of spiritual guidance and renewal,” and well-known French orientalist Olivier Roy considers it “completely

 

94. Yunusova, “Radikal’nye ideologii I musul’manskaya molodezh’ v Rossii.”

 

95. Alex Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions,” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2005): 3.

 

28 |the rise of radical and nonofficial islamic groups in russia’s volga region

 

 

apolitical and law abiding.”96The initial goal of Tablighi Jamaat was to return Indian Muslims and Hindus influenced by British culture, secularization, and Europeanization, to active and consistent faith. The importance of the geographical location decreased, but the focus on “return to faith” has remained. Itinerant preachers play the most important role in spreading “real faith”; there are no high-ranking positions within the organization. Rather, strangers unite in small groups and carry out their activities “from door to door.” In Rais Suleimanov’s opinion, these strategies make the activities of Tablighi Jamaat comparable to the missionary activity of Jehovah’s Witnesses.97In ac-cordance with its stresses on nonparticipation in political affairs and strict adherence to religious piety, Tablighi Jamaat puts forward strict requirements. Women must wear the hijab (covering their faces and hands) and remain at home most of the time.98Unlike other religious movements, Tablighi Jamaat focuses its work not on non-Muslims but on the existing Islamic community of believers in order to “correct” their faith in accordance with the precepts of their movement.

 

Some scholars take seriously the allegations of terrorism by Tablighi Jamaat members. Alexiev notes there are many cases of “individual Tablighis committing acts of terrorism.”99Xavier Ter-nisien, a French specialist, considers Tablighi Jamaat the “antechamber of fundamentalism,” emphasizing that the movement’s participants are engaged in terrorist activity across the world.100Its followers’ desire to adhere to the “ideal faith” makes Tablighis closer to Salafis and some other extremist groups. As is the case with Hizb ut-Tahrir, radicals may disguise their activity through this organization, using the apolitical mask of Tablighi Jamaat as a cover.

 

The exact number of followers of this movement in the Volga region is unknown. Rais Su-leimanov estimates that in Tatarstan there are about 350 people, primarily in Kazan, Yutazy, and Bavly. The movement emerged there in 1990s, originally under the leadership of Gabdelaziz Zagidullin. In the early 2000s one of the teachers in the Russian Islamic University was a Tablighi Jamaat follower.101Today, their leader is Rafael Samigullin, who in 2003–2004 was trained in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Outside of the Republic of Tatarstan, Tablighis have been active in the Saratov region, where in 2009, Russian supporters of the movement held a congress. Unlike other nono_cial groups, however, the Tablighis have definite constraints. Most important is their exotic appearance: they wear traditional Pakistani clothing, known as shalwar-kameez, and grow large beards. According to Valiulla Yakupov, the Tatar theologian who was killed in 2012, the appear-ance of the Tablighis often pushes young people away from the “strange Muslims.” 02

 

Tajikistan banned Tablighi Jamaat activities in 2006, and Russia followed suit in May 2009. The Supreme Court recognized the organization as extremist, a decision that prompted consider-able disagreement. The Saratov mufti Mukaddas Bikbarsov, as well as Rustem Valiulin, an Islamic

 

 

96. Barbara Metcalf, “Islam and women the case of the Tablighi jama’at,” Stanford Electronic Humanities Review 5, issue 1 (February 27, 1996), http://www.stanford.edu/group/SHR/5-1/text/metcalf.html. See also Olivier Roy, “Search for a perfect world of Islam,” Le Monde Diplomatique (Paris), May 15, 2002.

97. Rais Suleimanov, “Tablighi Jamaat v Tatarstane: struktura, chislennost, ideologiya” [Tablighi Jamaat in Tatarstan: structure, quantity, ideology], December 25, 2011, http://www.ru.journal-neo.com/ node/11532.

98. Metcalf, “Islam and women the case of the Tablighi jama’at.” 99. Alexiev, “Tablighi Jamaat: Jihad’s Stealthy Legions.”

100. Xavier Ternisien, “Rise of Suburban Salafists Worries Police and Muslims,” Le Monde, January 25, 2002 (in French).

101. Suleimanov, “Tablighi Jamaat v Tatarstane.”

 

102. Valiulla Yakupov, K propocheskomu Islamu [Toward the prophetic Islam] (Kazan, Tatarstan: Iman Publishing House, 2006), p. 387.

 

 

sergey markedonov | 29

 

 

human rights activist from the Republic of Udmurtia, criticized the Supreme Court decision, stressing that Tablighi Jamaat is a nonpolitical structure and that it is not a security threat for Russia. They highlighted that, in fact, it focuses purely on the literal adherence to Islam, not on the creation of a caliphate (as does Hizb ut-Tahrir) or on armed jihad (as do Salafis). However the ideology, insularity, and secrecy of Tablighi Jamaat lead its members to be intolerant of other

Muslims, not to mention the members of other religions. Thus, this environment could potentially lead to the rise of more proactive Islamists who would not limit their activities to only the “door to door” sermons.