On Feb. 29, the newest round of negotiations between the United States and North Korea ended. The North Korean side has agreed to freeze its uranium-enrichment program and refrain from long-range missile testing in exchange for food aid from the United States.
The Western media has predictably expressed hope about the revival of nuclear talks, and the U.S. State Department has described the negotiations as a "modest first step." Yes, it was a "step," and not the first in the seemingly endless nuclear negotiations between the United States and North Korea -but toward what?
The United States' official stance is unwavering: Its stated goal is the complete, irreversible, and verifiable nuclear disarmament of the North. This position has not changed over the past 20-odd years. In the meantime, the North has successfully tested plutonium devices, conducted a number of long-range missile launches (admittedly not so successful), and started an impressive uranium-enrichment program. We have never been as far from denuclearization as we are today.
This shouldn't be surprising: U.S. policy is hopelessly unrealistic. Under no circumstances will the North Korean government consider relinquishing its hard-won nuclear capabilities. And why should it?
The North's nuclear capability provides a deterrent that ensures that the leadership in Pyongyang won't suffer the sorry fate of Saddam Hussein and Muammar al-Qaddafi. Pyongyang's leaders assume, probably correctly, that the two dictators would still be alive and in power had they developed nuclear weapons. Once upon a time, in interacting with the North Korean dignitaries, Western diplomats would frequently cite Qaddafi's decision to surrender his half-baked nuclear program as a shining example to emulate. North Korean diplomats were not impressed, and they have been proved right.
From North Korea's perspective, nuclear weapons have been a great investment. They are a key means for the North to receive generous and all but unconditional aid from the international community, important for the regime's survival because its dysfunctional economy cannot be reformed due to internal political constraints.
The North's nuclear blackmail has worked brilliantly. Look no further than the recent deal: an agreement by the North to slow down its nuclear developments in exchange for a large volume of unconditional aid. Denuclearization cannot be made attractive because Pyongyang understands that by possessing a nuclear weapons capability, it can demand aid through negotiations.
Not only is the carrot useless, but so is the stick. Outside pressure and international sanctions won't persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons. Because only a post-Kim Korea might conceivably surrender its nukes, regime change could work, but the human and financial costs of a military operation would be prohibitively high.
Sanctions fail because China will be unlikely to participate in a sanctions regime. Even with genuine Chinese cooperation, the main victims will be normal North Koreans, whose survival ranks fairly low on the regime's agenda. Effective sanctions would merely result in the death of countless North Korean farmers, not a reversal of Pyongyang's policies. In the long run, such pressure might bring a revolution -but not before a million or two people starve to death. Even this is uncertain: If pressed, the regime will pretend to take steps toward denuclearization and start receiving aid again, bringing us back to where we are today. For the governments of democratic countries, sanctions have made sense to show voters that something is being done, but as a policy sanctions have failed completely -and likely will again.
07/03/2012, the Foreign Policy
Russian Says Western Support for Arab Revolts Could Cause a «Big War»
Russia’s foreign minister warned Wednesday that outside encouragement of antigovernment uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa could lead to «a very big war that will cause suffering not only to countries in the region, but also to states far beyond its boundaries».
Mr. Lavrov said Russia would use its position on the United Nations Security Council to veto any United Nations authorization of military strikes against the government of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria. The United Nations has repeatedly called for Syria end a crackdown on opposition demonstrators, which Arab League monitors say resulted in hundreds of deaths over the past month.
«If someone conceives the idea of using force at any cost – and I’ve already heard calls for sending some Arab troops to Syria – we are unlikely to be able to prevent this», Mr. Lavrov said. «But this should be done on their own initiative and should remain on their conscience. They won’t get any authorization from the Security Council».
Mr. Lavrov said foreign governments were arming «militants and extremists» in Syria, and he gave a bristling response to the American ambassador to the United Nations, who on Tuesday expressed concern about possible Russian arms shipments to Syria.
«We don’t find it necessary to explain or justify anything», Mr. Lavrov said. «We are only trading goods with Syria that are not prohibited by international law».
Russia’s foreign minister offered a similarly grave message about the possibility of a military strike against Iran, which he said would be a «catastrophe». He said sanctions now being proposed against Tehran were «intended to have a smothering effect on the Iranian economy and the Iranian population, probably in the hopes of provoking discontent».
Relations between Moscow and Washington have worsened over the past year, as the cordial tone of the «reset» between President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev has been replaced by a drumbeat of criticism. Mr. Lavrov said that Russia and the United States were not adversaries, and that «the cold war ended a long time ago». By contrast, however, he was glowing about Russia’s cooperation with China, which he said was «the highest in the history of our bilateral relationship».
18/01/ 2012, the International Herald Tribune
