> 0 ( = 0 - ). ( < 0). ─ MR = LMC; ─ , : │ > LATCmin MR = LMC │ < LATCmin │ = LATCmin |
() | P > MC |
1. MR = P ﴾1 + 1/ EPd﴿ = MC →Pm = MC/(1 + 1/ EPd) , ; , . | |
2. ( ) IL = (Pm − MC) / Pm = − 1/ EPd 0 < IL < 1 → P = MC I L = 0 P > MC I L > 0 . : (P ATC)× q () IL = ----------------= ------------------------ P× q (TR) | |
3. - (HHI)* n HHI = S12 + + Sn2 = ∑ Si2 i =1 Si2 − i - , % n − n = 1 HHI = 10000 n = 100 HHI = 100 HHI < 1000 , 1000 < HHI < 1400 1800 HHI > 1800 , * HHI 50 * HHI 100 | |
4. : 1 . 30 % 2- − 44% 3- − 54% 4- − 64% |
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3 | : MR1 = MR2 =... = MRn = MC |
: MR = P (1 + 1/EPD) MR1 = MR2 : P1 (1 + 1/Epd1) = P2 (1 + 1/Epd2) P1/P2 = (1 + 1/Epd2)/ (1 + 1/Epd1) | |
Epd1 > Epd2 → (1 + 1/Epd1) > (1 + 1/Epd2), P1 < P2. , , ; |
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A , , P 1- , .. P = MC. | ||||
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" " | ( ) . MR = MC. , (AVC) (ATC) . : P = ATC + k∙ATC = ATC (1 + k), AT ; k , = 1/Epd : , |
(Pm > MC) " "; (qm < qc); ; ; ; − ("" ) ( > ATCmin). -: ─ , ─ , ─ | ||
P = MC = ATCmin . | ||
PCP0E1 PmP0E2 ─ ─ - Pm > PC ( ) ─ - qm < qC C─ (" ") - (Pm > MC) B + C ─ = = (Pm ─ MC) (qm ─ qc) 1954 . . ( ). , 4 13 % . , , (rent-seeking behaviour), .. , . , , . | ||
LATCmin; (" "); . | ||