, (moral hazard). , , ~ 90 % , , , , , . , , , .. fraud, . , , . fraud , .
, (. 6) , , . .
-, , , , . , , . , . , , . , : , ?
, . , , . , . , - . .. . . , ( ), .
, . (.. ). . . , . , ( ). , , .
|
|
, , , , . , . ( , - ), . , , .
. , 9.00 18.00. , , 9.00, , , .
, . , . . , , . , . , . , .
-, - , , .
, , . , , . , , . - ( ). : -, , , , , , . moral hazard, fraud. . , , , . , , , , - , .., .
, . , , . , , . . , , , . , , .
, , . . : , , , , 500 $. - , . , , . - - .
|
|
, , , , , , . (, , ) .
, ( ) . , . , , , . , . .. , . . . , .. . .
, , - , 500 $ . , .
. . , , , , . .. , - . , , , .
. , , , , , . , , ( ).
, , , . , , , . , , , . , , , ( ), . . , . , , , .
|
|
, .
moral hazard . , , 0, . , - . , , . , .
, . , - (, ). , , , , 2-3 , . , , , , . , , . , - , . ( ). - .
.
-, .
: , , : - ! 10 , 16.45. ? . .. , . , , . , , , , .
-, .. .
, .
, , , 2-2,5 , , , . - - . , , - . , , 5000 . . 300 ( - ). , . , , , - , , , , , .
|
|
Volvo driver problem. , . Volvo , Volvo driver. , , , Pontiac Fire-bird Chevrolet Camaro, , - Volvo. . : , Volvo, , . : Volvo , .
-, , , .
, , . moral hazard . , , . , !
: . .
o
.
: . - , . , ̔ , - , , - , , , , , , . , .
: . (.. ), . :
o , ;
- , .
, .
1. , , , . - , . - , . , .
2. , . , . , , . , 2-3 . , , .
3. . , , . , - .
, , case study: The U.S. Savings and Loan Crisis .
Savings and Loan associations (S&Ls) - , . - 1000. S&Ls , , , . , S&Ls . - , . .. mortgage contract. , , , ( -) . , S&Ls .
|
|
S&Ls ( , ) 2/3 - ! , 70- . Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), , 40 . $, , , 100 . $. , S&L 200 . $, S&L, 100 . $. , 100 . $ - , 10 . $ . 100 . $ - . S&Ls 90- . 80- - 90- .?
, 70- - 80- ., S&Ls - residential mortgages (, ). , commercial mortgage (, , ), , residential mortgage - , . . , , , .
80- . S&Ls residential mortgages :
o corporate estate (, );
- junk bonds ( ).
Junk bonds - ( 30 %, ) . : , , , , . , , , , . , .
- ( !) c S&Ls residential mortgages corporate estate junk bonds. commercial real estate market, 80- . residential mortgages, - , , . , 15 % S&Ls , ( ). , 5-10 , S&Ls . S&Ls junk bonds - . , , junk bonds .
, 90- . 500 (.. ) S&Ls . FSLIC 30 % . , , 15 . , , . .
S&Ls:
o low capital requirements ( ), 3 %;
- .
( - , S&Ls!) ?
S&Ls residential mortgages, . , , . S&Ls . S&Ls , . ! . S&Ls . Savings. - , .. , .
, , ( ), . , S&Ls - . , , S&Ls , , G.P. Morgan, . , , , -, ( ). -, , , , 20-30 %, 20-30 % (, ). , . S&Ls.
, , .
S&Ls full authority to invest, .. , . , , , , 10 . - - .
S&Ls . , : Safe model Risky model.
Safe model , 110 % , - (.. 100 %). Risky model , , , 125 % ( ), - 65 %. ( ) 50 50.
0. , , .
- S&Ls own capital 3 %.
1. Description of Investment Opportunities
Safe Risky
Initial outlay 100 100
High return 110 125
probability.50.50
Low return 100 65
probability.50.50
Expected return (gross) 105 95
Expected return (net) 5 - 5
S&Ls ? Net return , Risky investment lemon investment, .. , , , ( lemon car). Lemon investment , , . , Safe investment. ?
2. Analysis of Safe Investment
Depositors Owners FSLIC Total
Initial outlay 97 3 0 100
High return (gross) 97 13 0 110
Low return (gross) 97 3 0 100
Expected return (gross) 97 8 0 105
Expected return (net) 0 5 0 5
3. Analysis of Risky Investment
Depositors Owners FSLIC Total
Initial outlay 97 3 0 100
High return (gross) 97 28 0 125
Low return (gross) 97 0 - 32 65
Expected return (gross) 97 14 - 16 95
Expected return (net) 0 11 - 16 - 5
, 97 %, interest rate 0, S&L. , safe.
3. FSLIC 97 %, 3 %. , 0, .. FSLIC (. 1). FSLIC 2. 32 ( 3) S&L S&Ls . S&L 97 % , 3 % ( ). .. 35 %. 3 % S&L, ( ). (32 %) , 32 % . .. S&L : 3 % , , , , .
Expected return. S&Ls? 125 50 % = 62,5; 97 50 % = 48,5. , 62,5 + 48,5 = 111. .. Risky investment 111. , net 11, gross - 14. , 11 , 5 (. 2). , S&Ls , , , . ( , S&Ls .)
, , , . , . , S&Ls fraud, .. , : , ; , , S&Ls , .., .. ( .) S&Ls .
o
, - . , .
I. ,
() employee shirking - , . , , , , .
.
time holes ( ), . holes . , on the job consumption ( ).
, . , . , , , , , . . , , , , , , , , ..
.
. , , . , , , .
shirking, ? ( , ). . , , . ?
employee shirking (Entfremdung der Arbeit), ( - ). , , . - , . , . , , ? :
à à
, , , , .. , . , , , , , , . :
o , , , , ;
- , , , , , ( ).
- . (.. 1- ), ; (.. 2- ), -.
( ). (.. 3- ), ; (.. 4- ), - .
, , .
, , , . : , . , , , .
. , - shirking, , .
, , , , . (, ), , , , .
, , -, , ! , , - , , . , . , , . , , ( , , , ..), , , . .. - .
, , , - . - , . , , - , , , - , . . , , .
-, , . , , , !.. , , .
-, ( -) , , , .
(team work): . . , , , , 25 , , . , , - .
: . , , , . .., , - , , , - , , , ( ). , , , , - .
, , . free riding, moral hazard. free riding - . free riding , .
- . , , . , free rider , , . - . . - , . free riding. free riding , , , , . , . 10 , , , . , , . . , , , .
, free riding , . , . free riding , , . , , - . , , . .. free riding .
shirking , , , , by proxy (), .
, . . , , . , - . ( ) . , , , -, , -, , . , - , , . , , , , .
. , , .. , , . 15 - 20 . - . - . , , .
.
shirking :
o , .. , ;
- , .. , , , ( ), ..; , ;
- (, ).
, , ? , .
, 0, - 100 %, 25 %. 10 % . , , , , 1/3. , :
o , ;
- .
: 25 %, - 0, (90 %) (10 %). . , . , , . , - , . , , ?
, 10 % - . , , () , . , 5 % . , 5 %, , , Ford Mondeo, Opel Cadet, .
, , (risk-lovers), , (risk-neutral people), , (risk-averse people). - , . , . - risk-taker. - , . , , (lending), , , ; , (borrowing), , .
, , . , , . 5-10 % ( ), , . , , . , . , , . , , , , , .
- . , . . , 5000 , , . , , , , . . , . , . , . - , , , . .
II. ,
(Adolf A. Berle) (Gardner C. Means), . (1932) , . , , , - ( , ). , .
, . , . . (Robert L. Heilbroner), , , . - XX . , manager misbehavior ( ).
moral hazard .
1. .
2. .
3. , .
4. (take-overs).
1. .
( ). , .. . . , , , , . , . . , , . , . , . , , . , . , - .
2. .
, ? ! , , , ? , , , , . , , , , - -, , . , , . , , , .
3. , .
? , . , , . , , . , , . . , , , , . , , , .
, . ? ? -, , - , . ? (take-overs) , -, (net performance), , . , , , - (, )! , , , , .
4. (take-overs).
take-overs ? , , . , take-overs . : 10 1977 1986 . , shareholders , 346 . $ 10 % 10 . 20-25 % . 346 . $ ! ? .. take-overs - , .
.. poison pills ( ). ( , ), take-over - n- . , - take-over, take-over, poison pills . , . , . (commitment) , , . , poison pills , . (, , ).
.
- , , , . , , (51 %) , , . , , .., , - , . .
, , . ., . , . . , , ( , ). - , - , . - , , . , , ( ), , , , , . -.
, , , . , .