THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT
Gunning for Trident
The coalition government is divided over whether and to what extent Britain should remain a nuclear power
WHEN David Cameron, the Conservative prime minister, set up the governments cost-cutting Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), he doubtless expected noisy lobbying from the top brass: to be told, for example, that severe cuts to the defence budget could seriously damage morale in the armed forces, carry grave political consequences and limit severely the [military] options available. He may not, however, have reckoned on those sentiments being publicly attributed to the defence secretary, Liam Fox, as they were this week when a letter to him from Dr Fox was leaked to the Daily Telegraph.
As the SDSR reaches its conclusion, arguments about how to cut defence spending have become rancorous. Among the bitterest fights is one that Mr Cameron had hoped to avoidover Britains nuclear deterrent. He originally exempted the deterrent, based on the American-designed, submarine-launched Trident ballistic missile, from discussion. The Trident-armed submarines are expected to need replacing in the early 2020s; the system is due to be renewed, at a cost of £20 billion ($32 billion). But his Liberal Democrat coalition partnerswho say they are against a like-for-like replacement for Trident, but would quite like Britain to ditch its nukes altogetherwon the right to examine the cost-effectiveness of the plan. There is talk of delaying the order for new submarines or finding a cheaper alternative.
Mr Cameron should have known better. Controversy has always attended Britains nuclear deterrent. No other country agonises so much over whether it should abandon or downgrade its nuclear capability. In France, the nuclear power closest to Britain in outlook, the force de frappé is widely seen as an untouchable symbol of prestige and independence.
By contrast, Britains liberal left has never overcome its distaste for the deterrent. It was a Labour prime minister, Clement Attlee, who resolved that Britain must have nuclear weapons, but his party has always been bitterly divided over them. When the House of Commons voted to renew Trident in 2007, the Labour government suffered one of its biggest rebellions; the decision was only approved with Tory help.
Many of those hostile to renewing Trident are against nukes on moral grounds. Others argue that the existing system was designed to deter the Soviet Union, and that a humbler model would suffice in a world where there is virtually no existential threat to Britain from nuclear-armed states (see map), nor much prospect of one.
Tridents boosters reply that the reasons for having it have not gone away. The number of countries with nuclear weapons, some of them hostile towards the West, might grow to nearly 20 over the next 40 years. China might throw its increasing military weight around. Russia might resort to nuclear blackmail. And while America still offers Europe nuclear protection, a second line of nuclear defence complicates the calculation foes must make.
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Critics of Trident who cite its cost are more convincing, not least because renewing it might mean sacrificing conventional kit, such as army helicopters or frigates for the navy. At the least, they argue, a decision can be postponed by a few years, because the Vanguard-class submarines now fitted with Trident missiles can actually be kept going until 2025or even longer.
The notion, advanced by some, that there is a credible, cheaper alternative is less persuasive. Nobody suggests Britain should have a land or aircraft-based deterrent: both are too vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. An idea that has some support, however, is to equip the new Astute-class submarines with nuclear-armed Tomahawk cruise missiles, or with a new longer-range, faster cruise missile.
The former is wildly impractical. The Tomahawk only has a range of about 1,500 miles, which is inadequate; it flies at only 550mph and can be easily shot down. And because Britain deploys conventionally armed Tomahawks, a target country detecting a missile launch might wrongly believe it was under nuclear attack and react accordingly. The idea of an improved cruise missile is not much better, not least because the huge development costs would be borne entirely by Britain. Those for Trident are met mainly by America.
There is, however, one solution that would save money while maintaining a reasonably effective nuclear deterrent. The current doctrine of always being able to keep one missile submarine on patrol, known as Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD), could be relaxed. According to this argument, Britain need only be certain to have a boat on patrol at times of heightened tensiona requirement that could be met by three or possibly only two submarines, rather than the current four.
Supporters of the status quo say that diluting CASD would be risky, allowing enemies the chance to time an attack (or to threaten one) when Britain had no boats at sea or to destroy a submarine as it left its base. Sailing at a time of crisis could be interpreted as an act of provocation in itself. Some defence experts, however, believe that CASD could be maintained with three Vanguard-class boats, and would certainly be viable with just three of the new, more reliable Trafalgar-class submarines.
If the government were to delay the order for new boats by two or three years, and then opt for only three, it could save several billion pounds in 2015-2020, when the defence budget will be under the greatest strain. There is one problem: politics.
Postponing most of the investment until after the next general electiondue by 2015would make it easier for an incoming government to ditch Trident or, more likely, prevaricate for so long that it amounts to the same thing. That prospect pleases Lib Dems but dismays many Tory MPs, who think too many concessions have already been made to placate their coalition partners. Dr Fox is not the only Conservative to regard defence of the realm as a sacrosanct, perhaps even resigning, issue.
