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1 420 (. . 153, ) ( . . I II. .: --, 1996. . 100, 196).
2 Lindenberg S. A New Push in the Theory of Organization. A Commentary on O. Williamson's Comparison of Alternative Approaches to Economic Organization // Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 1990. Vol. 146. 1. P. 81-82.
3 422 , , ( ), ( . . 197).
4 Macneil I. Contract Remedies: A Need for Better Efficiency Analysis // Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 1988. Vol. 144. 1. P. 7-9.
5 ., . . . .: , 1986. . 265.
6 Guerrien . Theory des Jeux. Paris: Economica, 1994. P. 77-90.
7 , 7 ( 4). 20 ., , + .
8 Harsanyi J. Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977. P. 22-25.
9 . . .: --, 1998. . 389-391.
10 Schotter A. Microeconomics. A Modern Approach. London: Harper Collins, 1994. p. 444-446.
11 Simon H. A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship // Econometrica. 1951. Vol. 19. P. 299-302.
12 . : / . . , . , . . .: , 1998. . 2, 2. . 45-46.
13 Coleman J. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge: Bolknap-Harvard University Press, 1990. P. 69-70.
14 Ibid. P. 71-72.
15 Ibid. P. 162-168. "-" , , , . , (Smelser N. The Rational and Ambivalent in the Social Sciences // American Sociological Review. 1998. Vol. 63. 1. P. 5-9), , , .
16 ,
( . . , "" . .: , 1996. . 128-143). , . , : Williamson . Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives // Adrninistrative Science Quarterly. 1991. Vol. 36. p. 271-276.
17 40 .
18 , 1998 . ("", 107 3 1998. . 4). . , . , , .
19 Macneil I. Contracts: Adjustments of Long-term Economic Relations under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law // Northwestern University Law Review. 1978. Vol. 72. P. 890.
20 Hart O., Holmstrom B. The Theory of Contracts / Advances in Economic Theory. Fifth World Congress. T. Bewley (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. P. 142-145.
21 ( ), , ( , ) (Conciliation / Dictionnaire encyclopedique de theorie et de sociologie du droit. Paris: LGDJ, 1993. P. 89).
22 Hirschman A. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
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23 30-40- (Joskow P. Vertical Integration and Long-term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning Electric Generating PIants // JournaI of Law, Economics and Organization. 1985. Vol. 1. 1).
24 Stiglitz J. Principal and Agent / The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds.). London: Macmillan, 1987. P. 968-969.
25 Coleman J. Op. cit. P. 149.
26 Kreps D. Corporate Culture and Economic Theory / Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Ed by A. Alt, K. Shepsle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1990. P. 113, 119.
27 . . , , , , (Coleman J. Op. cit. P 179-181). , , ( . . .: , 1969. . 48, 78-179).
28 Coleman J. Op. cit. P: 428-429.
29 Wlliamson . Op cit. P. 275-276.
30 Coase R. The Nature of the Firm, in The Firm, the Market and the Law. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988. P. 35.
31 . . .: -, 1996. . 22.
32 , . , (Buchanan J. An Economic Theory of Clubs // Economica. 1965. Vol. XXXII; Sandier T. Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1992. P. 16).
33 . . .: , 1990. . 29-30.
34 Coase R. Op. cit. P. 43.
35 , 1937 ., . . 20-40- . - . ( , , ) , (, , , ) , .: Andreff W. La crise des economies socialistes. La rupture d'un systeme. Grenoble: PUG, 1993. P. 36-42.
36 Wlliamson O. Op. cit. P. 281.
37 , . , , , , (Holcombe R., Holcombe L. The Market for Regulation // Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. 1986. Vol. 142. 4. P. 687-688),
38 Williamson O. Op. cit. P. 284-285.
39 . . . . 164.
40 Williamson . Op. cit. P. 292.
41 Ibid. P. 286-294.
42 54 " ". (. 52), (. 42), , (. 30, 4).
43 .. , . .: , 1997. . 2. . 129. " ", " ", " ". , : " ".
44 . . . 1. .: - , 1988. . 177.
45 , (Milgrom P., Roberts J. Economics, Organization and Management. London: Prentice Hall, 1992. P. 332).
46 Knight F. Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971. P. 270, 310.
47 , : . . . . 277-280.
9.