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1 Kreps D. Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. P. 10-26.
2 , , : Guerrien . La theorie des jeux. Paris: Economica, 1995. P. 11-16; Kreps D. Op. cit. P. 45-48.
3 Walliser B. A Simplified Taxonomy of 2x2 Games // Theory and Decision. 1989. Vol. 25. 2.
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5 Schotter A. The Economic Theory of Social Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. P. 22-24; Walliser B. Theorie des jeux et genese des institutions // Recherches Economiques de Louvain. 1989. Vol. 55. 4. P. 344-345.
6 Havrylyshyn O., Miller M., Perraudin W. Deficits, Inflation and the Political Economy of Ukraine//Economic Policy. 1994. Vol. 19. P. 360-362.
7 Guerrien B. Op. cit. P. 44-46.
8 ., . . .: - , 1997. . 245-252; Havrylyshyn ., Miller M., Perraudin W. Op. cit. P. 366.
9 ., . . .: , 1995.
10 Maynard J. Smith. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. P. 10. (, ) , .
11 . , 30- (Konrad ., Thum M. Fundamental Standards and Time Consistency // Kyklos. 1993. Vol. 46. Fasc. 4. P. 550-552). , , , ..
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12 Boyer R., Orlean A. How Do Conventions Evolve? // Evolutionary Economics. 1992. 2. P. 167-169.
13 Guerrien B. Op. cit. P. 65.
14 Axelrod R. The Evolution of Co-operation. London: Penguin Books 1990 P. 34, 39-46.
15 Walliser B. Theorie des jeux et genese des institutions // Recherches Economiques de Louvain. 1989. Vol. 54. 4. P. 349-355.
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