The median Russian elector was born in the last days of Josef Stalin, a totalitarian leader in the mold of Ivan the Terrible. She or he came of age politically under Leonid Brezhnev, who reduced the intrusive pressures of Stalinismbut only to the extent that this did not undermine the Communist Party's monopoly of power. Thus, a "normal" political system for a middle-aged Russian is not a democratic polity but an authoritarian, unresponsive, and corrupt bureaucratic party-state that mobilizes its subjects to endorse it unanimously in elections without choice. The Gorbachev initiatives begun in the late 1980s came long after the completion of the initial political socialization of most Russians.
The elections analyzed here are not just another vote, as would be the case in an established democracy. Instead, they are ballots held in the course of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the creation of a new state, the Russian Federation. This in turn has required the creation of a new constitutional regime. For the tens of millions of Russians who participated, the 1993 referendums and Duma election were evidence that the old authoritarian regime had gone; the second Duma election in 1995 confirmed this. But both ballots indicated significant electoral support for parties of dubious democratic commitment. The summer 1996 presidential election shows that the direction of change remains open.
The optimist can interpret the elections analyzed here as proof that Russia is now a democracy. But democratization is a lengthy process requiring fundamental changes in how a country is governed as well as in how governors are chosen. Many features of the relationship between the president and the Duma have yet to be resolved. The 1993 parliamentary challenge to the power of President Boris Yeltsin was resolved by the shelling of the parliament building. The big vote for Vladimir Zhirinovsky's slate of candidates in the December 1993 Duma election was a reminder that democratic parties are not the only parties competing for popular support in Russia. The vote in the 1995 Duma election for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and Gennadii Zyuganov, its 1996 presidential candidate, raises fundamental questions about whether it is a party of reformed or old-style communistsor an unstable amalgam of both. A pessimistic interpretation of the record of Russian elections is that they show Western-style democracy is not, or at least not yet, suited to the country. When public opinion surveys ask Russian people this question, half say that they think democracy is incompatible with Russian traditions, a quarter disagree, and a quarter consider it difficult to answer.
The political system of the Russian Federation today meets two criteria for democratic elections: everyone has the right to vote, and there is free competition between and within parties. The two 1993 referendums showed that the era of coerced and unanimous voting has ended. When offered a choice between voting for and against government-endorsed policies, Russians have divided into three substantial but conflicting groupspro, con, and abstainers. In the 1993 Duma election, no party won as many as one-sixth of the seats, and independents won the largest number of seats. In the 1995 Duma ballot, forty - three parties competed for votes, and an average of twelve candidates ran in each single-member parliamentary district. When the private opinions of the Russian people can be made public, the authorities can no longer pretend that "official" opinion defines public opinion, as it did in the days of the tsars and of the commissars.
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Because democratization cannot be accomplished overnight, the Russian political system today is best described as transitional. It has yet to develop three characteristics necessary for a stable democracy. One condition is that no significant party favor an end to free elections. Yet each election has shown Russian politicians supplying a variety of alternatives to democracycommunist, nationalist, or some combination of both. Before an election, politicians debate not only who should win but also whether an election should be held at all.
A second condition for establishing democracy is acceptance of the rule of law. Political emergencies facing the new Russian Federation have been met by extraconstitutional acts, including the use of troops in Moscow as well as against a rebel movement challenging the state's authority in Chechnya. The transfer of valuable state assets into private hands as part of the introduction of the market has created a small number of dollar multimillionaires and an atmosphere of economic lawlessness in which a Russian-style mafia has flourished. Whatever their individual principles, the great mass of members of parliament are inexperienced in democratic politics. Those with most experience of party politics, starting with President Boris Yeltsin and his chief officials, learned their skills in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin's former press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, described the effect thus: "Boris Nikolaevich does not have democratic convictions His ideologyif you like, his friend, his concubine, his lover, his passionis power. And everything that is outside the struggle for power is of much less concern to him".
Third, the coexistence of a president, prime minister, and parliament chosen in different ways in different years creates confusion about accountability to the electorate and about who has the best claim to democratic legitimacy. The first president, Boris Yeltsin, has responded by ruling through decrees as well as (or instead of) acts of parliament. Individually and collectively, members of the Duma are free to criticize the government in extravagant terms. But there are as yet no accepted conventions enabling the Duma to hold the prime minister and ministers accountable, as is the case in West European parliaments.
By comparison with postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Russia is a laggard. The first free competitive elections were held in the Russian Federation in 1993; in Central and Eastern Europe, they were held in 1990. Postcommunist political systems from Estonia and Poland to Hungary have demonstrated a readiness to change governments in response to votes in parliament and at national elections. When antidemocratic parties contest elections, they receive few votes, and there is widespread popular rejection of undemocratic alternatives. Russia lags behind its postcommunist neighbors because accountability to the electorate is weak and there is a significant supply and demand for undemocratic forms of government.
